1	Security+ Certification
2	ITU / CISSP Two Classes Network Infrastructure Focuses on the technical items Threats Application, Operational and Organizational Plans, Polices & Procedures What to do to improve Security
3	About The Book Security_ Certification Has some Obsolete Links! CC: http://www.commoncriteria.org The International CC Project has discontinued the www.commoncriteria.org Information/Knowledge Management Portal. http://www.commoncriteria.com/cc.html NIST: http://www.csrc.nist.gov/publications Computer Security Resource Center RFC: http://www.icann.rfceditor.org (Does not exist, references are on the CD!)
4	The Security+ Certification Program The Security+ Certification is a testing program sponsored by the Computing Technology Industry Association (CompTIA) that certifies the knowledge of networking technicians who have accumulated 24 months of experience in the information technology (IT) industry. http://www.comptia.org/certification.
5	Course in Two Parts Chapter 1 , "General Networking and Security Concepts," Chapter 2 , "TCP/IP Basics," Chapter 3 , "Certificate Basics,“ encryption and certificates Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and certification authorities. Chapter 4 , "Network Infrastructure Security," Chapter 5 , "Communications Security," describes ways to secure remote connections using a variety of
6	Part Two Chapter 6 , "Application Security," e-mail, Web browser, and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) clients Chapter 7 , "User Security," Chapter 8 , "Security Baselines," covers measures to increase the security of network and servers Chapter 9 , "Operational Security," Chapter 10 , "Organizational Security," Policies and procedures Chapter 11 , " Incident Detection and Response,"
7	The Security+ Exam Anyone can take the Security+ exam. There are no specific requirements or prerequisites, except payment of the fee. Individuals are permitted to take the exam as many times as they like. The exam is broken down into five sections, called objective domains.
8	Domain Area
9	Agenda Follow the Book – 5 Chapters Cover the examination topics – but will emphasis what works and what does not Some in Class Join Practice Test When Time Permits – Discussion of Sample Tests Why topics are important Homework – yes Skim the chapter do some projects do practice tests and discuss results Viewgraphs will be available at the end of the course.
10	Instructor Jim Bullough-Latsch jbl@4terrorism.com 818-775-1015 Security Experience Recent security assessments, plans, policies, procedures for Web Systems Worked on Classified Systems Architect for Multiple Systems with Sensitive Data Has plenty of Degrees and Lots of Years Currently Available for High Priced Consulting!
11	Why are you here? What do you know? What do you want to learn? Sign In Email contact etc.
12	Security Trends – Quick Summary On-line Business On-Line Information Access to Information Home Land Security Traditional Closed Systems – New DoD Business
13	Dollars! Security = $
14	Jim’s Definition of Computer Security “Protecting tomorrow systems against yesterday’s threats” Advice – Follow the Money
15	Resources http://commoncriteria.org http://csrc.nist.gov/ http://iase.disa.mil/policy.html#guides http://niap.nist.gov/ http://sepo.spawar.navy.mil/sepo/index2.html http://us.mcafee.com http://usa.visa.com/business/merchants/cisp_index.html http://v4.windowsupdate.microsoft.com/ http://www.cert.org http://www.criticalsecurity.com http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/5200-1r http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/ns871913.htm http://www.isalliance.org/ http://www.microsoft.com/security http://www.nsa.gov http://www.pogner.demon.co.uk/mil_498 http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep http://www.sans.org/top20/ http://www.symantec.com/ https://sans20.qualys.com/
16	General Networking and Security Concepts Corresponds to Chapter 1
17	Valuing Your Assets What is the loss to my company's assets if the company's data is compromised? What is the loss of intellectual property worth to my company? What is the loss in revenue or market share? What is the loss of privacy worth? What is the damage to my company's reputation worth?
18	Values Real value. Imagine you work for a company that makes tea. If your company has a formula for a special blend of tea and the yearly sales of that tea is $5 million, then you could say that formula has a value of $5 million. Five years from now, coffee might be more popular so the yearly sales of the tea might drop to $2 million. The value of the formula would have dropped from $5 million to $2 million. The information did not change, but the value of the information changed. Perceived value. The tea company you work for has a very smart management and marketing group. The management team has a plan for collaborating with a distribution company to increase the availability of the tea across the world. The marketing team has an idea for a marketing campaign that will make the tea more popular and could slow the rise in popularity of coffee.
19	Confidentiality Integrity Availability - CIA
20	Understanding the Goal of Security Confidentiality. Ensures that information is accessed only by authorized personnel. Integrity. Ensures that information is modified only by authorized personnel. Availability. Ensures that information and systems can be accessed when needed by authorized personnel.
21	Manage Risks
22	Risks, Threats, and Vulnerabilities Risk is the exposure to loss or possible injury. With information security, the risk is that your company's information will fall prey to outside forces and cause your company losses in time, money, and reputation. A threat, for information security, is any activity that represents possible danger to your information. Threats can take many forms, but any threat poses a danger to the C-I-A triad. In the example of the tea company, another company could steal the formula for the tea, or an employee could sell the formula to another company. A vulnerability is a weakness in your information security that could be exploited by a threat; that is, a weakness in your systems and network security, processes, and procedures. With the tea company, the formula for the tea is the valued information. People have to have access to the formula to make the tea and the formula has to be stored somewhere.
23	Plan and Plan Place a value on the information. Identify as many risks as possible and their associated threats and vulnerabilities. Mitigate the identified risks. Be aware that there are always things that you overlooked.
24	Summary Understand what is to be protected Confidentiality is assuring information is secure, with access limited to appropriate persons. Integrity is ensuring information is not accidentally or maliciously altered or destroyed. Availability is assuring information and communication services will be ready for use when expected. To mitigate risks, you must determine a value for the information you are protecting and what the potential liability would be if that information were in the wrong hands. The C-I-A triad is a way to remember that the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information is the concern of every IS specialist, and especially the security specialist.
25	Sources of Threat Is the threat due to a disaster of some sort, or is it due to an attack? If it is an attack, is it the threat coming from someone that works for the company, or from someone outside of the company? If the threat is from attack, is it a well-known attack? If the threat is an attack, are you able to identify it by reviewing audit files? If the threat is an attack, is it a business-related attack?
26	Threats from Disaster Natural disasters. To plan for a natural disaster, you must identity the types of natural disaster that are most likely, determine how often those events occur (historically), and then create a mitigation plan to minimize the impact on your company. The plan might not be implemented, but it should still be identified. Man-made disasters. Man-made or fabricated disasters that could affect the C-I-A triad include fire, loss of power, or a structural collapse. Because the meaning of disaster is a sudden or great misfortune, the event would be large and affect more than just information security. The concern and priority is for the safety of the people caught in the disaster, but good planning will help a company recover from the misfortune quicker. Mishap. A mishap is defined as an unfortunate accident. If a server fails and the specialists who repair and restore the server are all away, then the C-I-A triad is at risk. Consider the severity and likelihood of the event, whether it is a disaster of epic proportions, or a minor mishap so you can minimize risk.
27	Threats from Attack Threats based on the business. Some threats are directly related to the business your company is in; therefore, the attacks that are most likely to occur can be better identified. Threats that can be verified. Verifiable threats can be identified by data that is captured. Widely known threats. Some threats are widely known and you can simply read about them. Internal threats External threats
28	Attacks An attack is an attempt to bypass security controls on a computer. The attack could alter, release, or deny data. Attack types vary almost at the speed of light, but most have a name that describes the attack type well. Denial of service (DoS) Spoofing. Man-in-the-middle. Password guessing.
29	Malicious Code Virus. A virus is a program that can replicate, but not propagate, itself. It requires an installation vector, such as an executable file attached to an e-mail message or a floppy disk. A virus infects other programs on the same system and can be transferred from machine to machine through e-mail attachments or some form of media, such as a floppy disk. A virus can destroy data, crash systems, or it can be mostly harmless. Worm. A worm is a program that can replicate and propagate itself. It propagates itself by infecting other programs on the same system, and also spreading itself to other systems across a network, without the need for an installation vector. A worm can also destroy data, crash systems, or be mostly harmless. Trojan horse. Generally, a Trojan horse program looks desirable or harmless, but actually does damage. For instance, you might download what you think is a game, but when you run it, you find that it deletes all of the executable files on your hard disk.
30	Who Is Attacking? Hacker. The term hacker has two definitions, depending on to whom you are talking. To a programmer, a hacker can be someone who pounds out code that provides a quick solution to a difficult problem. The code might not be eloquently written, but it is functional and effective. To others, a hacker is someone who breaks security on an automated information system or a network. This type of hacker (also known as a cracker) is typically doing something mischievous or malicious, and although they might be trying to break into a system for what they consider a good and higher cause, they are still breaking into a system. Novice. A novice is someone who aspires to be a hacker, but does not have the technical skills. Typically, a novice will go to a Web site created by a hacker and run a program that attacks a network or computer system. Although a novice attack is usually easily identified and denied, it can provide enough "white noise" to hide evidence that a hacker is attempting a more serious attack on a system or network.
31	Threats Hackers (or crackers) trying to break into your network and computers Malicious code such as a computer virus or Trojan horse People who work for your company and are unhappy or are being paid to gather and sell your company's information Fire, flood, hardware failure, or natural disaster Threats can come from external sources, such as hackers and e-mail messages, but they can also come from sources internal to the company, as is the case with a disgruntled employee or someone who gains physical access to your computers.
32	Intrusion Points Intrusion points are areas that provide an access point to your company's information. Some of these are obvious, but others are not. For instance, you might realize that you need to install a firewall to protect the internal network and computers from hackers. If a hacker took a temporary job at your company, the firewall would be of little use. When identifying intrusion points, you must consider internal threats as well as external threats.
33	Some internal and external access points Internal access points Systems that are not in a secured room Systems that do not have any local security configured External access points Network components that connect your company to the Internet Applications that are used to communicate across the Internet Communications protocols
34	Network Infrastructure network infrastructure is all of the wiring, networking devices, and networking services that provide connectivity between the computers in a network. The network infrastructure also provides a way to connect to the Internet, allows people on the Internet to connect to your network, and provides people who work remotely with methods to connect to your network An external intruder would attack your connection to the Internet using an attack method, such as a DoS attack, or attempting a user name and password that allows them to authenticate. An internal intruder might connect to an open network jack and attempt to gain access to a server with shared resources that do not require a password.
35	Applications Used on the Internet An external intruder might place a virus or worm in an e-mail message and send the message to a user on your internal network. When opened, a virus might infect the system or provide the intruder with a way to control the system the e-mail was opened on. An internal intruder might use native operating system utilities to connect to other systems on your internal network that do not require a user name or password to gain access. They might also use an application such as a Web browser to access confidential information with limited access security.
36	Communications Protocols TCP/IP is the protocol suite used for communications on the Internet. Some attacks work by modifying the structure of the IP packet, but many successful intrusions occur at higher levels in the TCP/IP stack. For instance, an intruder can exploit a Web server using the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Communications protocols provide a common set of rules that computers use when communicating with each other. Some protocols offer no security, whereas others provide varying degrees of security. Intruders use their knowledge of communications protocols to compromise your C-I-A triad. The following are two examples: An external intruder might attack your company's presence on the Internet by using a DoS attack to disable your Web server. This would cause the information to be inaccessible to your customers. An internal intruder might disable an e-mail server by causing a flood of e-mail messages to be sent. This would disable the e-mail server so users could not retrieve their e-mail.
37	Building a Defense When building a defense, you should use a layered approach that includes securing the network infrastructure, the communications protocols, servers, applications that run on the server, and the file system, and you should require some form of user authentication. This is very similar to placing family heirlooms in a safe, in a cellar, in a house with a lock on the front door, with a large fence around the house. For someone to take the heirlooms, they would have to get past the fence, through the front door, to the cellar, and into the safe. This would be more difficult than if the heirlooms were placed just inside the fence. When you configure a strong, layered defense, an intruder has to break through several layers to reach his or her objective. For instance, to compromise a file on a server that is part of your internal network, a hacker would have to breach your network security, break the server's security, break an application's security, and break the local file system's security. The hacker has a better chance of breaking one defense than of breaking four layers of defense.
38	Layered Defense
39	Securing the Network Infrastructure Securing the network is the first step to creating a strong defense. When securing a network, minimize the number of access points to the network. For instance, if Internet access is required, configure a single access point and put a firewall in place.
40	Securing Systems System hardening. Includes removing unused services, ensuring that the latest security patches and service packs are installed, and limiting the number of people with administrative permissions. Hardening the system minimizes the risk of a security breach to the system. Application hardening. Includes applying the latest security patches and enforcing user-level security if available. Applications on a system can be client applications, such as a Web browser, or server applications, such as a Web server application. Hardening the applications on a system minimizes the chance of a security breach using an application. Enable local file security. Enabling local-level file security could include applying access control lists (ACLs) or an Encrypting File System (EFS); each would help ensure that only authorized people have access to the sensitive data stored in files on the hard disk.
41	Securing Securing Applications When you secure applications on a server, you ensure that the latest security patches and service packs are installed. You also enable any authentication methods available for the applications. User Authentication User authentication verifies that your company's information is being accessed only by authorized users. User authentication can take many forms, but typically employs a user name and password to access information. Smart Card Authentication Smart cards offer a two-factor authentication method. With smart cards, the system reads a chip that contains certain information, and then a password or personal identification number (PIN) must be provided to authenticate a user.
42	Preserving Data Forensics is applying science to law. For information security, forensics is the investigation and analysis of a computer for the purpose of gathering potential legal evidence. For this to occur, data has to be preserved, and a strict chain of custody protocol must be followed. Forensics specialists (typically working for law enforcement agencies) are called in to gather evidence. You must be aware of the nature of the evidence they are gathering so that you don't inadvertently destroy it. When electronic evidence is gone, it's gone.
43	Chain of Custody When you are preserving data in an attempt to prosecute someone who has breached your security, it is not only important to preserve the data, but also to identify the chain of custody for the evidence collected to ensure it is admissible and defendable in a court of law. Chain of custody procedures ensure the integrity of the information collected by tracking its handling and storage from the point of collection to final disposition of the evidence. This procedure is used after you have been attacked and are attempting to collect data that will be used to prosecute the attacker. For instance, if your company's Web site was hacked and the attackers downloaded an application that you sell, then you would need to collect as much data as possible to prosecute the thief. The data would have to be gathered, handled, and stored properly to be used as evidence. This includes limiting access to the evidence, documenting who handled the evidence, when it was handled, and why it was handled. Documentation of this process must include the date and purpose each time evidence is handled or transferred, and identification of each individual in the chain of custody.
44	Human Resource Concerns and Privacy Issues Managing information security also includes working with the Human Resources department of your company to ensure that when an employee leaves the company, his or her access to the company's data is terminated. You must be aware of your role in protecting the company by ensuring that you change the former employee's password and revoke his or her access rights. Privacy issues are a sensitive subject for some employees. These employees feel that what they do with the computer they use in the office is their own business, and believe the e-mail they receive is legally viewable by only them. According to a Privacy Rights Clearinghouse fact sheet on employee monitoring, employers can do the following: Monitor what is on a computer screen. Monitor and review e-mail. Monitor phone calls. Maintain and acquire phone records.
45	TCP/IP Basics Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) as it relates to information security – Chapter 2 in the book
46
47	What Is TCP/IP? TCP/IP is the suite of protocols used to communicate on the Internet. Each protocol of the TCP/IP protocol suite is associated with a layer of the seven-layer OSI communications model, which is an International Organization for Standardization standard. The seven layers are the Physical layer, Data Link layer, Network layer, Transport layer, Session Layer, Presentation Layer, and the Application layer.
48	Layers
49	7 Layers Physical layer. The Physical layer (Layer 1) is typically implemented in hardware and is responsible for placing data bits on and receiving bits from the communications media, such as coaxial cable. Data Link layer. The Data Link layer (Layer 2) is responsible for converting data packets that are received from the network layer and encoding them into bits. It is also responsible for accepting bits from the physical layer and converting them into data packets. The data packets that are formed into groups of bits are known as frames. This layer is divided into two sub-layers: the Media Access layer (MAC) and the Logical Link Control layer (LLC). The MAC sub-layer controls how a computer on a network gains access to the data, and permission to transmit that data on the network. The LLC sub-layer manages frame synchronization, error checking, and flow control. Network layer. The Network layer (Layer 3) provides routing and switching capabilities, and creates logical paths between two computers to create virtual circuits. This layer is responsible for routing, forwarding, addressing, internetworking, error handling, congestion control, and packet sequencing. When packets are received from the Transport layer, the Network layer is responsible for ensuring that the packet is small enough to be a valid packet on the underlying network. If the packet is too large, this layer breaks the packet into several packets, and on the receiving computer, this layer places the packets in the proper sequence to reassemble the packet. If the interconnecting devices cannot handle the amount of traffic being generated, this layer also provides congestion control. Transport layer. The Transport layer (Layer 4) transfers data between end systems or hosts, and is responsible for end-to-end error recovery and flow control between the two end systems. This layer ensures complete data transfer between the two systems. Session layer. The Session layer (Layer 5) establishes, manages, and terminates connections between applications on two computers. The session layer sets up, coordinates, and terminates all interchanges between applications on both computers. This layer manages session and connection coordination. Presentation layer. The Presentation layer (Layer 6) provides a heterogeneous operating environment by translating from the application's data format to the underlying network's communications format. This layer is also known as the syntax layer. Application layer. The Application layer (Layer 7) support end-user and application processes. Communication partners and quality of service levels are identified, user authentication and privacy considered, and any constraints on data syntax identified.
50	Layers
51	Understanding Network Interface Frames
52	Header information Header information differs with different LAN technologies, but there are some things that are always contained in the header. There is always a preamble, or some other sequence of bits that identify the start of a valid frame. All Network Interface layer headers also have fields for the destination and source MAC address. For instance, Ethernet II header packets contain a series of alternating ones and zeros that is 7 bytes long, followed by the bit sequence 10101011. This signals the beginning of a valid Ethernet II packet, and the 6 bytes of data following are the destination MAC address.
53	IP Header
54	Bits Version (4 bits). Internet Header Length (4 bits). Type of Service (8 bits). Total Length (16 bits). Identifier (16 bits). Flags (3 bits). Fragment Offset (13 bits). Time-to-Live (8 bits). Protocol (8 bits). Header Checksum (16 bits). Source IP Address (32 bits). Destination IP Address (32 bits). IP Options and Padding (variable).
55	ICMP Header Fields The ICMP protocol reports errors and control conditions on behalf of the IP protocol. This is because the IP protocol provides end-to-end datagram delivery capabilities, but is not designed to be absolutely reliable. Type (8 bits). Code (8 bits). Checksum (16 bits). Optional Data.
56	Understanding Fragmentation
57	Datagram The TCP datagram is packaged into a frame. A frame is placed on the local network. An intermediary router fragments the datagram into three fragments. Three fragments are received by the destination computer. Destination computer reassembles the three fragments using information in the header
58	Transport Layer Communications The UDP and TCP protocols are used at the Transport layer of the four-layer DARPA communications model. Understanding the header information for the Transport layer protocols and how each initiates communications will help you understand how hackers and crackers take advantage of that information to compromise your C-I-A triad. When one computer communicates with another, applications must be running on both computers to send and receive the data. The UDP and TCP protocols provide a procedure that the applications use to accomplish this communication. Two pieces of information that allow computers to communicate are the IP address and the port address. The destination IP address identifies the destination computer, and the destination port helps identify the application that will receive the information.
59	3 Way
60	SYN / SYN-ACK / ACK SYN segment. This is the first segment of the three-way handshake. The information sent by computer1 includes source and destination port, starting sequence number, the receive buffer size, maximum TCP segment size, and the supported TCP options. SYN-ACK segment. This segment is the reply that computer2 returns to computer1. The information sent includes source and destination port, starting sequence number, acknowledgment number, receive buffer size, maximum TCP segment size, and an acknowledgment that computer2 supports the options that computer1 sends. When computer2 sends this message, it reserves resources to support this connection. ACK segment. This segment is sent by computer1 to establish the final TCP connection parameters that will be used between the two computers. The information sent includes the source and destination ports, sequence number, acknowledgment number, ACK flags, and window size.
61	Possible Network Interface Layer Attacks Media Access Control (MAC) address spoofing. The header contains the MAC address of the source and destination computers and is required to successfully send a directed message from a source computer to a destination computer. Attackers can easily spoof the MAC address of another computer. Any security mechanism based on MAC addresses is vulnerable to this type of attack. Denial of service (DoS). A DoS attack overloads a single system so that it cannot provide the service it is configured to provide. An ARP protocol attack could be launched against a computer to overwhelm it, which would make it unavailable to support the C-I-A triad. ARP cache poisoning. The ARP cache stores MAC addresses of computers on the local network that have been contacted within a certain amount of time in memory. If incorrect, or spoofed, entries were added to the ARP cache, then the computer is not able to send information to the correct destination.
62	Possible Internet Layer Attacks IP address spoofing. If the IP header fields and lengths are known, the IP address in the IP datagram can be easily discovered and spoofed. Any security mechanism based on the source IP address is vulnerable to this attack. Man-in-the-middle attacks. This attack occurs when a hacker places himself or herself between the source and destination computer in such a way that neither notices his or her existence. Meanwhile, the attacker can modify packets or simply view their contents. DoS. With a DoS attack at this level, simple IP-level protocols and utilities can be exploited to overload a computer, thus breaking the C-I-A triad. Incorrect reassembly of fragmented datagrams. For fragmented datagrams, the Offset field is used with packet reassembly. If the offset is changed, the datagram is reformed incorrectly. This could allow a datagram that would typically not pass through a firewall to gain access to your internal network, and could disrupt the C-I-A triad. Corrupting packets. Because IP datagrams can pass through several computers between the source and destination, the information in the IP header fields is read and sometimes modified, such as when the information reaches a router. If the packet is intercepted, the information in the header can be modified, corrupting the IP datagram. This could cause the datagram to never reach the destination computer, or it could change the protocols and payload information in the datagram.
63	Possible Transport Layer Attacks Manipulation of the UDP or TCP ports. By knowing the UDP and TCP header fields and lengths, the ports that are used for communications between a source and destination computer can be identified, and that information can be corrupted or exploited. DoS. With a DoS attack at this level, simple IP-level protocols and utilities can be exploited to overload a computer, thus breaking the C-I-A triad. For instance, by knowing the steps involved in a three-way TCP handshake, a hacker or cracker might send the packets in the incorrect order and disrupt the availability of one of your servers. An example of this is a SYN flood, where a hacker sends a large number of SYN packets to a server and leaves the session half open. The server leaves these sessions half-open for a prescribed amount of time. If the hacker is successful in opening all available sessions, legitimate traffic will be unable to reach the server. Session hijacking. This kind of attack occurs after a source and destination computer have established a communications link. A third computer disables the ability of one the computers to communicate, and then imitates that computer. Because the connection has already been established, the third computer can disrupt your C-I-A triad.
64	Possible Application Layer Attacks E-mail application exploits. Attachments can be added to e-mail messages and delivered to a user's inbox. The user can open the e-mail message and run the application. The attachment might do immediate damage, or might lay dormant and be used later. Similarly, hackers often embed malicious code in Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) formatted messages. Exploits of this nature might take advantage of vulnerability in the client's e-mail application or a lack of user knowledge about e-mail security concerns. Web browser exploits. When a client computer uses a Web browser to connect to a Web server and download a Web page, the content of the Web page can be active. That is, the content is not just static information, but can be executable code. If the code is malicious, it can be used to disrupt the C-I-A triad. FTP client exploits. File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is used to transfer files from one computer to another. When a client has to provide a user name and password for authentication, that information can be sent across the Internet using plain text. The information can be captured at any point along the way. If the client uses the same user name and password as they use to attach to your corporate servers, that information could be obtained by a hacker or cracker and used to access your company's information.
65	Certificate Basics Chapter 3 Certificate Basics
66	Understanding Cryptography Confidentiality. Confidential means private or secret. Confidentiality ensures that only authorized personnel access information. One way to provide confidentiality is to encrypt data. Integrity. Integrity means having an unimpaired condition. Integrity ensures that information is accessed and modified only by those people who are authorized. Nonrepudiation. Repudiate means to reject as unauthorized or nonbinding. Nonrepudiation prevents an individual or process from denying performing a task or sending data. Identification and authentication. Access control allows access only to those who should have it. This is accomplished through identification and authentication, which ensures that when data is received or accessed, the sender is authorized.
67	Understanding Cryptography and Keys
68	algorithm that is used to encipher the message could be represented as C = M + K
69	Secure Hash A hash of data can be compared to a person's fingerprint. The fingerprint is unique to the person and of a relatively fixed size, but it is not nearly as large as the entire person. A hash is a unique identifier that is virtually unable to be reproduced with different data, and it is part of all of the data it represents. Some of the characteristics of MD4, MD5, and SHA-1 are as follows: MD4. Produces a 128 bit message digest (hash), very fast, appropriate for medium security usage. MD5. Produces a 128 bit message digest (hash), fast (not as fast as MD4), more secure than MD4, and widely used. SHA-1. Produces a 160 bit message digest (hash), standard for the U.S. government, but slower than MD5.
70	Symmetric Algorithms There are advantages and disadvantages to using symmetric keys. Some of the advantages are as follows: Speed. The algorithms used with symmetric encryption are relatively fast, so they impact system performance less and are good for encrypting large amounts of data (for instance, data on a hard disk or data being transmitted across a remote access link). Strength. Symmetric algorithms are difficult to decipher without the correct algorithm; therefore they are not easy to break. Well-tested symmetric algorithms such as 3DES and AES are nearly impossible to decipher without the correct key. Also, a technique can be used in which encrypted data can be encrypted a second or even third time. This way, if someone does break the encryption, he or she will have access to only more encrypted information. Some of the disadvantages of using symmetric keys are as follows: Poor key distribution mechanism. There is no easy way to securely distribute a shared secret; therefore wide-scale deployment of symmetric keys is difficult. Single key. There is a single key (single shared secret); therefore if the secret is compromised, the impact is widespread. Because there is a single key that can be shared with some or many, symmetric keys are not suited to provide integrity, authentication, or nonrepudiation.
71	Symmetric Keys DES. 56-bit key, U.S. Government standard until 1998, but not considered strong enough for today's standards, relatively slow. Triple DES. Performs 3DES operations, equivalent of 168-bit keys, more secure than DES, widely used, relatively slow. AES. Variable key lengths, latest standard for U.S. Government use, replacing DES. IDEA. 128-bit key, requires licensing for commercial use. Blowfish. Variable key length, free algorithm, extremely fast. RC4. Variable key length, stream cipher, effectively in public domain.
72	Asymmetric Algorithms Asymmetric algorithms use different keys to encrypt and decrypt data Public key. Provided to everyone who needs to send you encrypted data. Private key. This is the key that only you possess. When a plaintext message is encrypted using the public key, only the person with the private key can decrypt the cipher text. When a plaintext message is encrypted using the private key, it can be decrypted by everyone who possesses the public key, and that person can be certain the plaintext message originated with the person who possessed the private key
73	Asymmetric keys Some of the advantages are as follows: Provide a secure way to communicate with an individual. Because there is a public key and a private key, the public key can be provided to anyone that you want to send you encrypted information, but only you can decrypt that information. This helps ensure data confidentiality. Provide a method to validate an individual. You can use a private key to create a digital signature, which can be used to verify that you are who you claim to be. This helps provide an authentication method and nonrepudiation. Digital signatures are explained in Lesson 2 of this chapter. Some of the disadvantages of using asymmetric keys include the following: Asymmetric encryption is relatively slow. Asymmetric algorithms are generally slower than symmetric algorithms due to the increased computational complexity required to encrypt and decrypt data; therefore it is not suited to provide confidentiality for large amounts of data.
74	Specific Asymmetric Keys RSA. Variable-length key, de facto standard for public key encryption. Diffie-Hellman. Variable-length key, used to securely establish a shared secret. Elliptic curve cryptography. Variable-length key, currently too slow for widespread implementation.
75	Standards and Protocols For algorithms to be widely used and supported, protocols and standards are created and are maintained by various governing bodies. The National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) and the National Security Agency (NSA) have available current information on cryptographic standards and specifications. The NIST provides measurements and standards for U.S. industries and creates Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) that detail computer security. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) documents how cryptographic mechanisms are implemented with current communications protocols.
76	Summary Cryptography is encrypting and decrypting data to provide information security. The four goals of cryptography are to provide data confidentiality, data integrity, identification and authentication, and nonrepudiation. A key is a set of instructions that govern ciphering or deciphering messages. A secure hash function is a one-way mathematical function that creates a fixed-sized representation of data. A symmetric key is a single key used for encrypting and decrypting data, and everyone that is allowed to encrypt and decrypt the data has a copy of the key. An asymmetric key pair is made up of two keys that form a key pair; one key is used to encrypt data, and the other key is used to decrypt data. A public key is provided to many people and is used to validate that a message came from the private key holder or to encrypt data to send the private key holder. A private key is a secret key that only the private key holder has. It is used to decrypt information encrypted with the public key, and also to create a digital signature.
77	Confidentiality You provide information confidentiality by using symmetric algorithms. Because symmetric key encryption relies on a shared secret, everyone that needs access to a particular file need only have a copy of the encryption key that was used for encryption. Symmetric encryption is also a relatively fast encryption method, so it is suited for encrypting large amounts of data, such as files on a computer Distributing the symmetric key to the users who need access Securing the symmetric key against loss, theft, or distribution to unauthorized people Maintaining a list of people authorized to use the symmetric key and retrieving the key from people and computers no longer authorized to access the data Replacing the symmetric key in the event that it is compromised
78	Integrity Communications integrity with secure hash functions. When secure hash functions are used to create a message digest, the message digest can be saved and later compared to another message digest from the same data to ensure the data has not been tampered with. For instance, if you run a hash function on a file and then a few weeks later rerun the hash function and the two message digests do not match, the file has been modified. Encrypted data integrity with keyed hash functions. Keyed hash functions provide data integrity. When data is hashed, a key is used in the hashing algorithm. The recipient must use this key to validate the message. The hash value produced with the keyed hashing algorithm is called a message authentication code (MAC). The key operates much like a symmetric key in that it becomes a shared secret. This key is sometimes referred to as a magic number. When using this type of algorithm, the receiving application must also possess the session key to recompute the hash value so it can verify that the base data has not changed. This provides a mechanism to ensure that the encrypted data has not been tampered with. Communications integrity using an asymmetric algorithm. Asymmetric algorithms can provide integrity by being combined with hash functions to produce digital signatures. You create a digital signature by creating a message digest of a plaintext message using a hash algorithm. You then encrypt the hash value with your private key. The receiver decrypts the encrypted hash value using your public key and then generates a hash of the message. If the decrypted hash value from you matches the hash value the receiver generates, the message could only have originated from you and could not have been tampered with in transit.
79	Identification and Authentication Authentication with asymmetric algorithms. Asymmetric algorithms can provide authentication using a challenge-response protocol. When you want to access a system, the system sends a random number (called a nonce) that you encrypt with your private key. The system then verifies your credentials by decrypting the encrypted nonce using your public key. This type of authentication is ideally suited for use with remote access and physical access to restricted areas, such as the room where your servers are located. Authenticating users with symmetric algorithms. Symmetric algorithms can authenticate users. When you want to access a system, the system sends a nonce that you use as the key to use a symmetric algorithm to encrypt your password. The system then uses the nonce to decrypt your password. You are successfully validated if the decrypted password matches the password the system has for you.
80	Nonrepudiation Nonrepudiation using public key asymmetric algorithms. There are two keys (a public key and a private key), and only you possess your private key. The private key can be used to create a digital signature, and anyone with a copy of your public key can verify that the message is from you and has not been altered. This also provides proof that you sent the message.
81	Components of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
82	PKI The PKI provides a framework of services, technologies, protocols, and standards that enable you to deploy and manage a strong and scalable information security system. With the PKI in place, companies can conduct business electronically and be assured of the following: The person or process sending a transaction is the actual originator. The person or process receiving a transaction is the actual receiver. The integrity of the data has not been compromised.
83	Components of PKI Digital certificates. An electronic credential used to authenticate users. Certification Authority (CA). A computer that issues digital certificates, maintains a list of invalid certificates, and maintains a list of invalid CAs. Registration authority (RA). An entity that is designed to verify certificate contents for a CA. Key and certification management tools. Tools for auditing and administering digital certificates. Certificate publication point. A location where certificates are stored and published. Public key-enabled applications and services. Applications and services that support using certificates.
84	What Are Certificates? Certificates are a digital representation of information that identifies you and are issued by CAs, which are often a TTP. A TTP is an entity trusted by other entities with respect to security-related services and activities
85	Uses for certificates Secure mail. Configure the Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) protocol to ensure the integrity, origin, and confidentiality of e mail messages. Secure Web communications. Use certificates with Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or TLS protocols for authenticating and encrypting communications between servers and clients. Secure Web sites. Use certificates to authenticate access to secure Web sites. Custom security solutions. Use certificates to provide confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and nonrepudiation for custom applications. Smart card logon process. Use certificates to authenticate users with smart card devices attached to their computers.
86	CA A CA is a computer that is recognized as an authority trusted by one or more users or processes to issue and manage X.509 public key certificates, a revocation list of CAs that are no longer valid, and a revocation list of certificates that have been revoked. Each CA creates and maintains a list of the certificates that it has issued, as well as a list of certificates that have been revoked. A CA can revoke a certificate for many reasons, for example: When the certificate owner's private key is lost When the owner leaves the company he or she works for When the owner changes names A CA must also maintain a list of CAs that are no longer valid. A certificate revocation list (CRL) is a signed, time-stamped list of server serial numbers of CA public key certificates that have been revoked. The CRL is necessary to allow CAs to accept and reject certificates that were issued by a different CA.
87	PKI can be compared to performing credit card transactions remotely
88	Network Infrastructure Security Chapter 4
89	Infrastructure Security Overview Physical sabotage; equipment destruction Packet sniffing; eavesdropping Network mapping and port scanning to identify targets for attack Reconfiguration or disabling of connectivity or security devices Use of your network devices to launch an attack on another network Use of your network devices to host unauthorized, illegal, or destructive services Erasing data
90	Securing Physical Equipment Hire security guards. Install sensors, alarms, and closed-circuit TV cameras and monitoring equipment. Use physical access badges and security cards. Install backup electrical power. Bury network cables (or enclose them in walls). Lock wiring closets and server rooms. Encase equipment in protective housings. Use tamper-proof seals on equipment casing. Install fences and parking lot gates. Maintain fire-extinguishing and detection systems appropriate for your equipment and facility. Ensure your facilities meet appropriate construction standards.
91	Securing Equipment Configuration Equipment configuration is another area in which your network infrastructure might be vulnerable to an attack. Attacks on device configuration can be physical, such as rerouting cables in a wiring closet, or logical, such as changing the routing table of a router. Physical security is required to protect equipment from physical configuration attacks. Logical security is required to secure your network infrastructure from attacks on device configuration that can take place remotely. For example, routers and switches maintain logical routing or switching tables, which allow them to correctly transfer network packets to their proper destination. An attacker might try to modify or corrupt those tables to redirect or stop normal network communication. To protect your routers, switches, and central servers, you can assign complex passwords to management consoles to help prevent someone from gaining unauthorized administrative access. Complex passwords have mixed case, alphanumeric, multiple characters, and special characters that are difficult to guess or crack with a password-cracking program. Secure passwords should be at least six characters in length, which is defined as a minimum by many operating system vendors and organizations. However, some are moving to seven or even eight character password minimums.
92	Coaxial Cable There are several different types and grades of coaxial (coax) cable, but the same basic structure applies to all of them. All coaxial cable has a center conductor, an outer conductor, and an outer sheath. Electronic transmissions (representing data) travel through the center conductor. Coaxial cable is more difficult to cut than the other types of cable discussed in this lesson, but a pair of wire cutters can quickly cut through it nevertheless. Cutting coaxial cable isn't necessary to disrupt communications on a coaxial network. A heat or energy source placed near coaxial cabling can also impede communications. Because coaxial cable is typically used in bus topologies, a cut wire or severe electromagnetic interference (EMI) or radio frequency interference (RFI) could bring down the entire network. To protect your coaxial network segments from sabotage, you should be sure to protect the physical cable. Any point along the network is vulnerable to compromise and sabotage due to the bus nature of a coaxial network segment.
93	Eavesdropping on Coaxial Networks Because coaxial networks utilize a bus topology, signals traverse the entire segment on their way to the destination host. Any connection along the coaxial network is susceptible to eavesdropping protect your network cable as much as possible by burying it underground, placing it inside walls, and protecting it with tamper-proof containers Document your cable infrastructure. Investigate all outages on your coaxial network. Physically inspect your cable infrastructure on a routine basis. Investigate all undocumented hosts and connections.
94	Twisted-Pair Cables All twisted-pair cables have one or more pairs of wires that are twisted together inside a cable sheath Twisted-pair networks can also be sabotaged. The cables can be easily cut with a pair of wire cutters or regular office scissors, or a heat or energy source could disrupt communications. However, twisted-pair networks typically utilize a star configuration, so the loss of a single cable should not disrupt the entire network, unless the cable that was cut provided connectivity to the central server or gateway router you should be sure to protect the physical cables. Protecting central connectivity devices such as hubs and patch panels is more important than protecting individual twisted-pair segments
95	Eavesdropping on Twisted-Pair Networks and Countermeasures Physically attaching a protocol analyzer to a twisted-pair connection point. A protocol analyzer is a device or computer software program that allows its user to capture and decode network traffic. Other names for it are data sniffer, network sniffer, or packet sniffer. Splicing into the twisted-pair cable. Using escaping electromagnetic signals to eavesdrop on signals passing through the wire.
96	Fiber Optic Cable Fiber optic cable utilizes a glass or plastic filament that conducts light pulses to transfer data. Outside of the fiber optic core, there is a glass cladding, a plastic spacer, protective Kevlar fibers, and then a protective outer sheath. Fiber optic cable is the most secure cable because it cannot be affected by electromagnetic interference and does not leak electrical signals. Of the cable types discussed, fiber optic cable is the most expensive and most difficult to install.
97	Sabotaging a Fiber Optic Cable Sabotage of a fiber cable is easier than sabotage of any other cable type. Fiber cables can be crushed, bent, snapped, and often inadvertently damaged. Any damage to the fiber cable disrupts the signal between the two points to which the cable is attached. To protect your fiber optic cable from sabotage or the possibility of eavesdropping, protect the physical cable. If there is an outage between two points on the fiber cable, you must determine why that outage occurred to ensure that it was not due to sabotage. Eavesdrop on a fiber network you must disrupt the communications between two hosts. The fiber cable must be cut, the ends polished, and a fiber optic card inserted between the connection. During the insertion, the connection between the two hosts is unavailable.
98	Cabling Summary A power outage could also be used to insert rogue devices. Consider that an attacker might create a situation to insert a device. After a power outage, you should ensure that your network cables are still properly routed and that no rogue devices are present. Network cabling is a vulnerable part of your network infrastructure. An attacker or spy must have physical access to your cable (or at least be able to get close to the cable) to exploit or attack your network cable infrastructure
99	Hubs Compromising Hubs Hubs are simple to sabotage if the saboteur has physical access to the device. A hub can be disconnected or destroyed, or simply turned off, if it is an active hub. When a hub is disabled, the devices attached to it are unable to communicate. Eavesdropping through a hub is also possible. If there is an open hub port or one of the legitimately connected devices can be disconnected, an attacker or spy could use the port to gain information or attack another device on the network. The open or disconnected port could be used to place a hacking device (or another computer to which the hacker has full control) to gather information from the network or to attack other devices. Securing Hubs Because hubs are physical devices, they should be physically protected.. Managed hubs can be used to detect physical configuration changes. Managed hubs report hub statistics and connection information to management software.
100	Switches and Bridges Compromising Switches and Bridges As previously mentioned, switches and bridges maintain a table that contains MAC address mappings to each of their connection points. The table allows the switch or bridge to direct Layer 2 communications to the correct network segment or port, making it a potential target for attack. A central switch could also be the target of a saboteur. Destroying a central switch, disconnecting power, or disconnecting all of the network cables would disrupt all communications passing through the device. Along the lines of disrupting communication, there are scripts such as macof that can be used to flood bridges and switches with random MAC addresses. Assuming the switch or bridge is able to learn new addresses, such an attack could reduce the performance of the switching or bridging device and slow network traffic. Gaining Administrative Access If an attacker can gain administrative access to the switch or bridge, he or she can reroute network communications. These communications can be redirected to a host on the network under the control of the attacker, which could be the attacker's system or a system the attacker was able to gain control over using some other technique. If the attacker decides to sabotage communications on the network, he or she can do so at any time once administrative access is obtained. Of course, the attacker must gain administrative access to the bridge or switch first. A skilled attacker can do this by trying default administrative passwords or running a password attack against the device. Switches in particular often have a function called port mirroring, which allows an administrator to map the input and output from one or more ports on the switch to a single port. This is meant to help in troubleshooting communication problems on a network. However, if an attacker is configuring port mirroring, he or she could watch all network traffic that passes through the switch. The attacker might do this to gather information about other systems on the network or in hopes of decoding a password or other valuable information, such as trade secrets. Occasionally, connectivity devices might have software configuration problems or security vulnerabilities. For example, someone might discover that a switching table can be updated without any administrative authorization, meaning anyone could compromise your switch, if they had access to your network. Vendors usually resolve problems like these quickly once they are discovered. To protect your connectivity devices, be sure to keep track of vendor patches and install them when they are available. ARP Cache Poisoning Although switches and bridges segment the network, it might be possible for an attacker to use Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache poisoning (also known as ARP spoofing) to propagate traffic through a switch.
101	Securing Switches and Bridges Secure all physical connections on your network segments. Be sure that no unauthorized connections can be made. Also, limit physical access to your switch locations and use security personnel and monitoring devices to ensure connectivity devices are secure. Set complex passwords for administrative consoles. Restrict device administration to as few people as possible from as few locations as possible. Also, be sure to change administrative passwords routinely and whenever an administrator leaves the company. Manually enter ARP mappings on critical devices, such as central servers, switches, bridges, and so on. If you manually enter all necessary MAC addresses, prevent the switch or bridge from learning new addresses. Keep your switches and bridges current with the latest vendor security patches. Document your device configurations so you know for sure what is normal and authorized. Monitor your network with management tools that alert you to unauthorized connections. Tools such as ARPWATCH can monitor activity on your network and keep a database of MAC-to-IP address mappings. The tool can also alert you to changes in these ARP mappings.
102	Routers Compromising Routers As previously mentioned, routers maintain both ARP caches and routing tables. These tables allow the router to transfer and route communications appropriately on the network, and they are also potential points of attack. A central router might also be the target of a saboteur. Destroying a central router, disconnecting power, or disconnecting its network cables would disrupt all communications passing through the device. Securing Routers Ensure the routers are kept in locked rooms or containers. Check the security of all incoming and outgoing connections. Limit physical access to your network cable infrastructure, wiring closets, and server rooms. Use security personnel and monitoring equipment to protect connection points and devices. Utilize complex passwords for administrative consoles. Be sure to change administrative passwords routinely and whenever an administrator leaves your organization. Set access list entries to prevent inappropriate connections and routing of traffic. For example, packets with the IP address of your internal network should not be coming from the external interface on the router. If this happens, it is usually an indication that someone is trying to perform IP address spoofing as described in Chapter 2. Keep your routers current with the latest vendor security patches. Be sure to document and regularly review your network configuration. Disable RIPv1 and utilize only RIPv2 or other routing protocols that allow you to secure router updates with passwords.
103	Firewalls The term firewall is used generically to describe any device that protects an internal network (or host) from malicious hackers or software on an external network (or network to which the host is connected). Firewalls perform a variety of tasks to filter out potentially harmful incoming or outgoing traffic or connections. They are often implemented between an organization's internal network and the Internet. However, this is not always the case. Some firewalls are used to subdivide internal networks or even to protect individual computers. The five main services that firewalls provide are packet filtering application filtering proxy server circuit-level stateful inspection
104	Packet Filtering Source IP Address. This field is used to identify the host that is sending the packet. Attackers could modify this field in an attempt to conduct IP spoofing. Firewalls are typically configured to reject packets that arrive at the external interface bearing a source address of the internal network because that is either an erroneous host configuration or an attempt at IP spoofing. Destination IP Address. This is the IP address that the packet is trying to reach. IP Protocol ID. Each IP header has a protocol ID that follows. For example, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is ID 6, User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is ID 17, and Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is ID 1. TCP or UDP Port Number. The port number that indicates the service this packet is destined for, such as TCP port 80 for Web services. ICMP Message Type. ICMP supports several different functions that help to control and manage IP traffic. Some of these messages can be used to attack networks, so they are frequently blocked at the firewall. For example, ICMP echo requests can be exploited to cause a broadcast storm. Fragmentation Flags. Firewalls can examine and forward or reject fragmented packets. Some flawed implementations of TCP/IP allow for the reassembly of fragmented packets as whole packets (without receipt of the first packet, which contains the full header information). A successful fragmentation attack can allow an attacker to send packets that could compromise an internal host. IP Options Setting. This field is used for diagnostics. The firewall should be configured to drop network packets that use this field. Attackers could potentially use this field in conjunction with IP spoofing to redirect network packets to their systems.
105	More Application Filtering An application filtering firewall intercepts connections and performs security inspections. The firewall must be equipped with the appropriate applications to perform this task. In this way, the firewall acts as a proxy for connections between the internal and external network. The firewall can check and enforce access control rules specific to the application. Application filtering firewalls are used to check incoming e-mails for virus attachments; these firewalls are often called e-mail gateways. Proxy Server Like an application filtering firewall, a proxy server takes on responsibility for providing services between the internal and external network. However, the proxy server can actually be the server providing the services or it can create a separate connection to the requested server. In this way, a proxy server can be used to hide the addressing scheme of the internal network. Proxy servers can also be used to filter requests based on the protocol and address requested. For example, the proxy server could be configured to reject incoming connections to http://www.internal.local or outgoing connections to http://www.external.net. Circuit-Level A circuit-level firewall controls TCP and UDP ports, but doesn't watch the data transferred over them. Therefore, if a connection is established, the traffic is transferred without any further checking.
106	Multiple Firewalls
107	Stateful Inspection A stateful inspection firewall works at the Network layer. The firewall evaluates the IP header information and monitors the state of each connection. Connections are rejected if they attempt any actions that are not standard for the given protocol
108	Exploiting Firewalls Compromising the firewall management console or password. Firewalls can be configured through a management console. Management of the firewall might be restricted to a connection through a serial cable or it could be open to remote network connections. An attacker might try to gain access to the firewall through these administrative connections. If successful, the attacker could take control of the firewall. Circumventing the firewall. If there is another way into the network, or another path can be created, then compromising the firewall would be as simple as using a different path. A dial-up connection from a server on your internal network, for example, could provide another path to your network. Physically tampering with the firewall. If attackers can gain physical access to your firewall, they might attempt to disconnect it, reroute network cables to avoid it, or sabotage it in some other way.
109	Securing Firewalls Keep track of security bulletins concerning your firewall product. Apply all software patches as they are made available. Update virus definition files routinely. Physically protect the firewall. Document the firewall configuration and review that configuration regularly. Limit the methods for managing the firewall. If remote management is allowed, use the most secure authentication available. Use complex passwords. Be sure to change administrative passwords routinely, and always change them when an administrator leaves your organization. Know and test the firewall rules by trying to make connections to unauthorized ports or services from outside the firewall. Ensure that there are no network paths or connections that can be used to circumvent the firewall
110	Remote Access Remote Access Service (RAS) servers allow clients to use dial-up connections to access servers and internal networks. The RAS server typically has a modem (or bank of modems) that allows incoming connections from clients that might be compromised by an attacker. Compromises of RAS servers typically involve exploitation of the RAS software itself. These are usually the result of an oversight in the software programming by the RAS server vendor. The RAS server vendor should provide software patches to correct these programming flaws. Check for software patches from your RAS server and apply them as they are made available Attackers might also try to make unauthorized connections by guessing passwords. To protect against this, some RAS servers allow for password policies. When possible you should configure a password policy to lock out accounts after several incorrect logon attempts. Lockout settings are typically configured for three to five incorrect logon attempts, and the lockout period is often about 30 minutes. Such a policy helps prevent someone from successfully guessing a password
111	TACACS+ Terminal Access Controller Access Control System Plus (TACACS+) is an authentication protocol that provides a method for a remote access client to authenticate with an RAS server. Authentication is used to determine whether a remote user should be allowed to access the network. The TACACS+ server can be configured with an access control list or it can contact a central server, such as a UNIX Network File Service (NFS) server running Network Information Service (NIS). NFS is the standard file sharing mechanism used by UNIX servers. An NIS server provides a master accounts database for users on a UNIX-based network.
112	Remote Authentication and Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) is a protocol similar to TACACS
113	Telecommunications Hacking Attackers who gain unauthorized access to the PBX system could potentially use it to do the following: Make free long-distance calls by changing billing records. Compromise or shut down the organization's voice mail system. Reroute incoming, transferred, or outgoing calls. Compromise the rest of your organization's network, as PBX systems are part of your network infrastructure. For example, locate a modem-equipped PC. Use that PC to create an analog connection to the internal network, and then use the analog connection to access the internal network.
114	Modems Remove all unnecessary modems from computers on your network. Check for software updates for all computers that must have modems. Monitor security bulletins from modem vendors for newly discovered security gaps and apply software patches as soon as they are available. Isolate computers configured with modems to limit the damage that can be caused by those systems should the modem be compromised. Monitor computers with modems regularly to ensure they have not been compromised.
115	Wireless There are numerous exploits that compromise wireless networks. Many wireless network devices allow you to enable strong authentication and encryption mechanisms to prevent unauthorized network access and packet sniffing. However, additional "hacker tools" are available that could allow attackers to compromise data encryption, steal passwords, and even hijack (or take over) sessions between clients and servers. To keep a wireless network reasonably secure you must stay current on the latest security bulletins and vendor patches. You should also implement the most secure authentication and encryption methods available. Wireless networks can also be interrupted by EMI and RFI and the only real countermeasure to that is a stronger signal. This is something the wireless user or administrator can typically only control by purchasing an AP that offers a stronger signal. When laying out a wireless network you should ensure that you don't place workstations or APs near any obvious sources of EMI and RFI, such as elevators, copier machines, radio transmitters, or industrial equipment.
116	Security Zones Intranet. The organization's private network; this is used by employees and those internal to the organization (such as contractors and on-site partners). Perimeter network. Used to provide services to users on the Internet and sometimes those inside the organization. Extranet. Depending on the security devices used and the network layout, the external network might be called a wide area network (WAN), Internet, public network, or untrusted network.
117	Intranet Firewall protection from the external network and the perimeter network Installing and updating virus-scanning software Observing and auditing confidential resources Using host-based firewalls for computers that maintain confidential data Documenting and auditing the physical infrastructure and critical systems configurations to ensure there are no unauthorized devices or connections Restricting and monitoring access to critical systems, services, and confidential information Removing unnecessary services from mission-critical servers
118	Perimeter Network
119	Security for the perimeter network security zone Firewall protection from the external network Limiting the services provided and removing all unnecessary services Auditing of all services Name resolution services that are separate from the internal network Removal or restriction of remote management services Careful documentation and auditing of all physical and logical configurations Frequent data and configuration backups
120	Extranet
121	Security for the extranet security zone Firewall protection from the external network Limiting the services provided and removing all unnecessary services Auditing of all services Use of VPN connections
122	Implementing NAT Static NAT. Static NAT maps an internal IP address to an external IP address on a one-to-one basis. For example, if you have an internal IP address of 192.168.1.1, you could map that to a single public IP address. The security benefit to using this type of NAT is that external clients do not have direct access to your internal clients (nor can they obtain the actual IP address of the internal client). Further, your firewall could be configured to block the private IP range from traversing it. This prevents IP spoofing attacks from the external network. Dynamic NAT. Dynamic NAT maps a range of internal IP addresses to a range of external IP addresses. For example, a range of five internal addresses might be mapped to a range of five external IP addresses. The security benefits of this type of NAT are similar to static NAT. One additional benefit is that the external-to-internal address mappings can change, which might further complicate attacks focused on an individual network host. Overloading NAT. Overloading NAT is also known as port address translation (PAT). This is a possibly the most poplar form of NAT because a single Internet address can provide Internet access to multiple private clients. Overloading can be implemented with a single or multiple Internet addresses
123	Using VLANs Intranet switches can be used to create VLANs on the intranet. VLANs are essentially virtual subnets that are created by switches and supported by routers that are VLAN enabled. Switches create VLANs by tagging the data frames that they receive from hosts. Each port on the switch can be associated with a VLAN, which behaves like an IP subnet and might require routing to communicate with hosts on other VLANs. Although the physical connections on the network might not change, VLANs can change the network infrastructure
124	Securing and Monitoring Workstations Install virus-scanning software and keep virus definition files up to date. Monitor system logs for errors. Configure logging or auditing for critical system resources and data. Limit access to workstations to a specific user or set of users. Control access to local and shared resources. Remove unnecessary applications and services. Configure automated or centralized backup systems. Ensure the latest operating system and application security fixes are applied and kept current.
125	Monitor Workstations System logs. Look for error messages about file system changes, permission changes, services that no longer start, or other system modifications and critical error messages. Audit logs. Audit logs are typically activated to track specific resources, such as access to a secure folder, file, or printer. Hard disk space. Workstations might fail to log errors, fail to detect attacks, or fail to function properly at all if they run out of hard disk space. Network counters. If a system is under attack, network counters could indicate that an attack is underway. Access denied errors. When an attacker is attempting to guess a password, the server component that shares files on the workstation might record a high number of errors by which access is denied.
126	Protecting Mobile Devices Antitheft devices. Consider using motion alarms, locking cables, and tracking equipment to protect your mobile devices. Additional identifying marks or colors. If a laptop is stolen from an environment in which many people are carrying laptops, it might be difficult to spot. If your company logo or your name appears prominently on the laptop or mobile device, you might be able to recognize it more easily. Further, if your devices have identifying marks, a thief might be less likely to steal it in the first place, knowing the theft would be more difficult to conceal. Data encryption. If your mobile devices are used to transport sensitive data (such as trade secrets or competitive information), you might consider using data encryption, which can prevent sensitive files from being easily decrypted.
127	Securing and Monitoring Servers Physically secure servers in a locked room. Prevent users from logging on interactively (at the console). Carefully control and monitor access to resources, such as the file system, shared data, and printers. Carefully control and monitor access to all services. Additional services such as user databases, account directory services, Web services, and other services provided by servers should be logged. You should track service access errors (access denied), failures of services to load, and any changes in running services (either additional services or services that are disabled or stopped). Frequent backups of server configurations, shared data, and service data are critical to protecting your server. Be sure to test backups by actually restoring data to an alternate location to be sure that your backups are working. Also, you should keep your backup media physically secure. Password protect backup media, encrypt it, and store it in fireproof safes if possible.
128	Monitoring Connectivity Devices Network management systems are available from many vendors that collect information from connectivity devices. For example, if a router or switch is dropping frames because too much data is incoming, an alert can be sent to the network management system's console and potentially other locations, such as the network manager's pager. Many network management systems use the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) to gather information from a variety of systems, including individual hosts on the network. Cisco, IBM, and Hewlett-Packard all offer network management systems that can monitor network devices.
129	Implementing Intrusion Detection An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a hardware device with software that is used to detect unauthorized activity on your network. An IDS is usually configured to log and alert you to unauthorized activity on your network. IDSs can be implemented on individual hosts, servers, at the network perimeter, or throughout the entire network. Some IDS solutions are designed as distributed systems, with agents on all hosts on the network. There are several different ways in which IDSs might be implemented. Here is a general list of how they are implemented and used: A network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is used to discover attackers on your network. A NIDS monitors network traffic and traffic patterns that can be used to discover someone attempting a denial-of-service attack, port scans, or attempts to guess the password to a secured resource. Snort is one of the most popular examples of a NIDS. A system integrity verifier (SIV) monitors a single system's file structure to determine if (and when) an attacker modifies, deletes, or changes a system file. Tripwire is one of the most popular examples of an SIV. A log file monitor (LFM) parses system log entries to identify possible system attacks or compromises. LFMs can protect a single computer or multiple computers. SWATCH (The Simple WATCHer and filter) is a popular example of an LFM for UNIX operating systems.
130	Using Honeypots and Honeynets Honeypots are systems that have no production value and are designed to be targets for attackers. Honeynets are networks of honeypot systems or a single honeypot system that simulates a network of vulnerable devices. Honeypots do not solve security issues or protect hosts from direct attacks, however, as do firewalls and IDSs. Many security people are against using honeypots in operational systems. Introduces Risk, Introduces More Work
131	Communications Security Chapter 5
132	Remote Access Connectivity Remote access computers with sensitive documents might be exposed. The remote user could lack awareness of security concerns. The remote computer can be an avenue for unauthorized access to critical systems. Modems are vulnerable to dial-in attacks. The remote access computer might harbor malicious code. Remote access computers typically lack proper backups.
133	Remote Connections Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) connections use modems and standard telephone lines to transmit data. They are relatively slow, but also flexible and universal. Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) is a digital dial-up service provided by telephone companies that offers greater speeds than PSTN, but this service is also more expensive. Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) is a point-to-point connection that also uses standard telephone lines to carry digital signals at much higher speeds than PSTN connections. Community antenna television (CATV) networks use cable television technology to provide users with economical high-speed Internet access. However, CATV is a shared service, which can mean that bandwidth diminishes as more local users concurrently access the Internet.
134	Remote Connection Mediums
135	Telephone Advantages of using dial-up remote access instead of providing access across the Internet include the following: Limited hacker access. The Internet spans the entire world and the number of users is astounding. Many of the computers connected to the Internet have modems, and they typically dial a local number to gain access to the Internet. By providing access to your network through a dial-up solution, you will likely curb the number of hackers that attempt to hack your network, and they will probably be localized to a smaller geographic location, namely where the number is a local telephone call. Less likelihood of being sniffed. Although it is possible to sniff communications across telephone lines, it requires that the hacker gain access to the telephone lines between the remote user and the remote access server. All telephone calls are routed through telephone switching equipment and the hacker can intercept the communication there, but the chances of that are less likely. You should still encrypt communication over public telephone lines to be safe. Disadvantages of using dial-up lines to provide a remote access solution include the following: Costs for long-distance connections. If all of the remote access users are within the local calling area, there will be no toll charge for long-distance calling, but if you are supporting users that travel or those based in different geographical locations, the cost of providing the solution is greatly increased. Lower productivity. Because the connection speed is limited, remote users might not be as efficient and productive as they would be using a higher speed solution. War dialing. A technique known as war dialing can be used to dial all of the telephone numbers in a specified range and record those that have a modem connected. Once the phone numbers that have modems are identified, a hacker can redial the system and attempt to break into the computer system. Because the telephone prefix exchange for most organizations is easy to discover, modems that allow users to dial in present a risk.
136	Internet Some of the advantages of using Internet-based remote access include the following: Lower costs. If remote access users are based in a widespread geographical area or if they travel, providing access through the Internet can be less costly because long-distance charges can be minimized. Because most areas have Internet access without incurring toll charges, using an ISP that supports your remote user base can be a cost-effective solution. Fewer external connection points. Because most companies require access to the Internet, using a single Internet connection that is secured for access to your company's internal network as well as access to the Internet from the internal network provides a single connection point. This limits the number of connection points a hacker can attempt to exploit and requires you to maintain and monitor fewer access points. Disadvantages of using the Internet to provide access to your internal network include the following: More attacks. Because you are connecting your internal network to the Internet through a secured communications link, hackers from around the world can attempt to break into your network. Similarly, because connections over cable modems and DSL are much faster than dial-up connections, hackers can carry out more attacks, and more sophisticated attacks, in a shorter period of time than they can over dial-up connections. More accessibility to sniffing. The traffic generated between your remote users and your remote access server is more susceptible to sniffing. A hacker can intercept the communications traffic and, even if it is encrypted, attempt to decrypt the information. Increased exposure to attackers. Before a user makes a VPN connection to the company network, he or she must first connect his or her computer to the Internet securely. If the user's computer is not secured, his or her computer and the company's network are susceptible to any attacker on the Internet
137	Remote Connection Requirements
138	Protocols Common data-link layer protocols. The two computers to be connected must share common protocols at the data-link layer and above. This means that you must configure both computers to use a data-link layer protocol suitable for point-to-point connections, such as PPP or SLIP. There must also be network and transport layer protocols in common, such as Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), Internetwork Packet Exchange (IPX), Network Basic Input/Output System (NetBIOS), or NetBIOS Enhanced User Interface (NetBEUI). TCP/IP configuration. If your remote computer will be using TCP/IP to communicate with the host network, the computer must be assigned an IP address and other configuration parameters appropriate for that network. You can configure the TCP/IP settings if someone familiar with the host network supplies them to you, but most remote networking solutions enable the network server to assign configuration parameters automatically using Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) or some other mechanism. Host and remote software. Each of the computers to be connected must be running an application appropriate to its role. The remote (or client) computer needs a client program that can use the physical layer medium to establish a connection (by instructing the modem to dial a number, for example). The host (or server) computer must have a program that can respond to a connection request from the remote computer and provide access to the network. Security. The host computer and the other systems on the network to which it is attached must have security mechanisms in place that control access to network resources to ensure that only authorized users are permitted access and to restrict the access of those authorized users to only the resources they need.
139	Using Authentication Mechanisms Password Authentication Protocol (PAP). PAP requires a password, but the password is sent in clear text, so PAP is not a very secure authentication mechanism. All 32-bit Windows operating systems include remote access client support for PAP. Shiva Password Authentication Protocol (SPAP). SPAP incorporates a reversible encryption mechanism. SPAP is more secure than PAP, but does not provide protection against remote server impersonation. All 32-bit Windows operating systems include remote access client support for SPAP. Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP). CHAP uses the Message Digest 5 (MD5) hashing algorithm to hash the password. The hash is then sent from client to server. Only the remote access server can send the password challenge. Because the password is never sent from the client to the server, this is more secure than PAP or SPAP. All 32-bit Windows operating systems include remote access client support for CHAP. Microsoft Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (MS-CHAP). - Microsoft's implementation of the CHAP protocol provides greater security than CHAP, in addition to Microsoft networking domain login support capabilities. MS-CHAP uses the Message Digest 4 (MD4) hash made up of the challenge string, session ID, and the MD-4 hashed password. All 32-bit Windows operating systems include remote access client support for MS-CHAP. Microsoft Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol version 2 (MS-CHAPv2). - MS-CHAPv2 introduces larger initial encryption key size and support for bi-directional challenge. This allows the client to send a challenge to the remote access server. MS-CHAPv2 also uses MD4 for hashing of the password. All 32-bit Windows operating systems include remote access client support for MS-CHAPv2.
140	Centralized Authentication
141	RADIUS The RADIUS client and server to support different operating systems and hardware architectures. The RADIUS client and server to be geographically separated. User accounts to be secure by ensuring that the accounts are located on servers within the private network and not directly exposed to the Internet. Encryption of authentication traffic between the RADIUS client and the RADIUS server using Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) or VPN tunnels. Outsourcing of dial-up remote access to third-party organizations. The remote access client connectivity feature provided by the RADIUS client determines how remote users access the private network. The remote access client connectivity provided by the RADIUS client allows the remote access users to do the following: Use a variety of authentication protocols, such as CHAP, MS-CHAP, or clear text to get authenticated. Encrypt data using a variety of encryption algorithms, such as Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption (MPPE) or Data Encryption Standard (DES). Connect using a variety of protocols, such as TCP/IP or Internetwork Packet Exchange/Sequenced Packet Exchange (IPX/SPX). Connect using a variety of technologies, such as dial-up modems, DSL, or ISDN.
142	RADIUS Authentication and Accounting Access servers, such as dial-up network access servers, VPN servers, and wireless access points, receive connection requests from access clients. The access server, configured to use RADIUS as the authentication, authorization, and accounting protocol creates an Access-Request message and sends it to the RADIUS server. The RADIUS server evaluates the Access-Request message. If required (as is the case when Extensible Authentication Protocol [EAP] is used), the RADIUS server sends an Access-Challenge message to the access server. The access server or access client processes the challenge and sends a new Access-Request to the RADIUS server. The user credentials and the authorization of the connection attempt are verified. If the connection attempt is both authenticated and authorized, the RADIUS server sends an Access-Accept message to the access server. If the connection attempt is either not authenticated or not authorized, the RADIUS server sends an Access-Reject message to the access server. On receipt of the Access-Accept message, the access server completes the connection process with the access client and sends an Accounting-Request message to the RADIUS server. After the Accounting-Request message is processed, the RADIUS server sends an Accounting-Response message to the access server. The client connection request is completed.
143	TACACS and TACACS+ TACACS+ has three major components: The protocol support within the access servers and routers The protocol specification The centralized security database
144	TACACS+ supports the following features Authentication. The TACACS+ protocol forwards many types of user name and password information. This information is encrypted over the network with MD5. TACACS+ can forward the password types for Apple Remote Access (ARA), SLIP, PAP, CHAP, and standard Telnet. This allows clients to use the same user name and password for different protocols. TACACS+ is extensible to support new password types such as Kerberos CHAP (KCHAP). TACACS+ authentication supports multiple challenge and response demands from the TACACS+ server. This allows token card vendors to provide advanced features such as sending back a second token-generated number after the first one is manipulated by a security server. Authorization. TACACS+ provides a mechanism to tell an access server which access list a user connected to port 1 uses. The TACACS+ server and location of the user name and password information identify the access list through which the user is filtered. The access list resides on the access server. The TACACS server responds to a user name with an Accept message and an access list number that causes that list to be applied. Accounting. TACACS+ provides accounting information to a database through TCP to ensure a more secure and complete accounting log. The accounting portion of the TACACS+ protocol contains the network address of the user, the user name, the service attempted, protocol used, time and date, and the packet-filter module originating the log. The billing information includes connect time, user ID, location connected from, start time, and stop time. It identifies the protocol that the user is using and might contain commands being run if the users are connected through Telnet. The auditing information includes which commands and arguments were used and the connection the command came from. The protocol provides enough information so that a server can produce intruder detection routines, reporting statistics, number of packets, and number of bytes
145	RADIUS and TACACS+ Differences RADIUS runs over User Datagram Protocol (UDP), whereas TACACS+ runs over TCP. As a result, the transport is more reliable and less sensitive to disruption of the lower layers. RADIUS provides a user profile with authentication that defines all the user-specific parameters, whereas TACACS+ separates authentication and authorization. TACACS is typically used only for network devices, such as routers and switches, whereas RADIUS is used by computers and network devices
146	Virtual Private Networks
147	VPNs include the following Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP). Created by the PPTP Industry Forum (US Robotics [now 3Com], 3Com/Primary Access, Ascend, Microsoft, and ECI Telematics). Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP). A combination of PPTP and L2F (designed by Cisco Systems), which evolved through the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards process. Internet Protocol Security (IPSec). An architecture, protocol, and related Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol,
148	Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol It is a Layer 2 protocol that encapsulates PPP frames in IP datagrams for transmission over an unsecured public IP network, such as the Internet. It accomplishes authentication through the same methods as PPP, including PAP, CHAP, and MS-CHAP. It requires an IP-based network and header compression is not supported. PPTP does not support IPSec, and encryption is provided using standard PPP methods.
149	Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol L2TP is a mature, widely implemented IETF standards track protocol. L2TP encapsulates PPP frames to be sent over IP, X.25, Frame Relay, or Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) networks. When configured to use IP as its transport, L2TP can be used as a VPN tunneling protocol over the Internet. L2TP over IP uses UDP port 1701 and includes a series of L2TP control messages for tunnel maintenance. L2TP also uses UDP to send L2TP-encapsulated PPP frames as tunneled data. These encapsulated PPP frames can be encrypted or compressed. When L2TP tunnels appear as IP packets, they take advantage of standard IPSec security using IPSec transport mode for strong integrity, replay, authenticity, and privacy protection. L2TP was specifically designed for client connections to network access servers and gateway-to-gateway connections.
150	Internet Protocol Security End-to-end security for IP unicast traffic, from client to server, server to server, and client to client using IPSec transport mode. Remote access VPN client and gateway functions using L2TP secured by IPSec transport mode. Site-to-site VPN connections, across outsourced private wide area network (WAN) or Internet-based connections using L2TP/IPSec or IPSec tunnel mode. An automatic security negotiation and key management service is also provided using the IETF-defined IKE protocol. Implementing IKE provides three authentication methods to establish trust between computers: IKE uses only the authentication properties of Kerberos v5 authentication. Public/private key signatures using certificates are compatible with several certificate systems, including Microsoft, Entrust, VeriSign, and Netscape. Passwords, termed preshared authentication keys, are used strictly for establishing trust between computers. IPSec provides integrity protection, authentication, and (optional) privacy and replay protection services for IP traffic. IPSec packets are of two types: IP protocol 50 called the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) format, which provides confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity. IP protocol 51 called the Authentication Header (AH) format, which provides integrity and authenticity for packets, but not confidentiality.
151	Secure Shell Protocol The transport layer protocol (SSH-TRANS) provides secure authentication, confidentiality, and network integrity. The possibility of SSH-TRANS providing encryption is also available. Transport is typically run over a TCP/IP connection, but it can also be used on top of another reliable data stream. The user authentication protocol (SSH-USERAUTH) authenticates the client-side user to the server. It runs over the transport layer protocol. The connection protocol (SSH-CONN) multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into several logical channels. It runs over the user authentication protocol.
152	SSH also provides protections Packet spoofing. An IP packet appears to be yours, but it is actually someone else's. IP/Host spoofing. An IP address or host name is yours, and someone else is using it. Password sniffing. The network packets that contain your password are read. Eavesdropping. The network packets are read and someone sees what you are typing.
153	How Wireless Networking Works
154	Wireless Standards 802.11a. Maximum speed 54 Mbps 802.11b. Maximum speed 11 Mbps; fallback speeds 5, 2, and 1 Mbps 802.11g. Maximum speed 22 Mbps; fallback speeds 11, 5, 2, and 1 Mbps
155	Wireless Communicating Across Multiple APs Wireless networking allows a user to travel from room to room or building to building and stay connected to the network at all times. There are two different modes of communications that can be configured with wireless APs: basic service sets (BSS) and extended service sets (ESS). BSS When an AP exists, the wireless devices (notebooks and handhelds) no longer communicate in ad hoc mode. Instead, all traffic from one device destined for another device is relayed through the AP. Even though it seems like this would double the amount of traffic on the wireless local area network (WLAN), this also provides for traffic buffering on the AP when a device is operating in a low-power mode. With this model, the computers can only communicate through the AP they are close to and have selected. ESS The compelling force behind a WLAN deployment is the fact that with IEEE 802.11, users are free to move about without switching network connections manually. With a single infrastructure BSS, this moving about would be limited to the signal range of one AP. Through the ESS, the IEEE 802.11 architecture allows users to move among multiple infrastructure BSSs. In an ESS, the APs talk among themselves, forwarding traffic from one BSS to another, as well as switching the roaming devices from one BSS to another
156	Wired Equivalent Privacy Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is the mechanism created in the IEEE 802.11b standard that utilizes a cryptographic security countermeasure to provide confidentiality, and has the added benefit of becoming an authentication mechanism. This benefit is realized through a shared key authentication that allows the encryption and decryption of the wireless transmissions. When high security is needed, other mechanisms, such as IEEE 802.1x, should be employed. Most APs advertise that they support WEP in at least 40-bit encryption, but often the 128-bit option is also supported. For corporate networks, 128-bit encryption-capable devices should be considered as a minimum. With data security enabled in a closed network, the settings on the client for the Service Set Identifier (SSID) and the encryption keys have to match the AP when attempting to associate with the network, or it will fail.
157	The WEP Authentication Process The requestor (the client) sends a request for association. The authenticator (the AP) receives the request, and responds by producing a random challenge text and transmitting it back to the requestor. The requestor receives the transmission, ciphers the challenge with the shared key stream, and returns it. The authenticator decrypts the challenge text and compares the values against the original. If they match, the requestor is authenticated.
158	WEP Advantages and Disadvantages To gain access, the degree of sophistication of the intruder has to improve, and specific intent to gain access is required. All messages are encrypted using a checksum to provide some degree of tamper resistance. Privacy is maintained through the encryption. If you do not have the key, you cannot decrypt the message. WEP is easy to implement. Set the encryption key on the AP and repeat the process on each client. WEP provides a very basic level of security for WLAN applications. WEP keys are user definable and unlimited. You do not have to use predefined keys, and you can and should change them often. The RC4 encryption algorithm is a known stream cipher. This means it takes a finite key and attempts to make an infinite pseudo-random key stream to generate the encryption. Once you alter the key you have to tell everyone so they can adjust their settings. The more people you tell, the more public the information becomes. Used on its own, WEP does not provide adequate WLAN security. WEP must be implemented on every client as well as every AP to be effective
159	Security Implications of Using WEP From a security perspective, WEP can be used to deter curious hackers, but used alone, it will not stop determined hackers. Because WEP relies on a known stream cipher, it is vulnerable to certain attacks. By no means is it the final authority, and it should not be the only security countermeasure in place to protect your network. Some of the security challenges faced with wireless networks include the following: With wireless communication, it would be a relatively easy matter to put together the hardware to allow an eavesdropper to pick up signals in open, unsecured areas without having physical access to the interior of a building. Therefore, physical security is more challenging. Users might have the need to move between wireless zones without having to reconfigure components. In situations in which the wireless zone is in a different administrative domain, users should be able to contact the appropriate domain controller, even if that zone is, for example, located in an airport or another office that provides wireless connectivity.
160	Keys Security of 64-Bit versus 128-Bit Keys It might seem obvious to a nontechnical person that something protected with a 128-bit encryption scheme would be more secure than something protected with a 64-bit encryption scheme. This, however, is not the case with WEP. Because the same vulnerability exists with both encryption levels, they can be equally broken within similar time limits. With 64-bit WEP, the network administrator specifies a 40-bit key, typically 10 hexadecimal digits (0 9, a f, or A F). A 24-bit IV is appended to this 40-bit key, and the RC4 key scheme is built from these 64 bits of data. This same process is followed in the 128-bit scheme. The administrator specifies a 104-bit key this time 26 hexadecimal digits (0 9, a f, or A F). The 24-bit IV is added to the beginning of the key, and the RC4 key schedule is built. Acquiring a WEP Key As mentioned previously, programs exist that allow an authenticated or unassociated device within the listening area of the AP to capture and recover the WEP key. Depending on the speed of the machine listening to the wireless conversations, the number of wireless hosts transmitting on the WLAN, and the number of IV retransmissions due to 802.11 frame collisions, the WEP key could be cracked within a couple of hours. If an attacker attempts to listen to a WEP-protected network when there is very little network traffic, it would take much longer to obtain the data necessary to crack WEP. Armed with a valid WEP key, an intruder can successfully negotiate association with an AP and gain entry onto the target network. Unless other mechanisms such as media access control (MAC) filtering are in place, this intruder is now able to roam across the network and potentially break into servers or other network machines. If MAC filtering is occurring, another procedure must be attempted to get around this. Wireless Transaction Layer Security WTLS is the security layer of the WAP, providing privacy, data integrity, and authentication for WAP services. WTLS, designed specifically for the wireless environment, is required because the client and the server must be authenticated for wireless transactions to remain secure and because the connection needs to be encrypted. For example, a user making a bank transaction over a wireless device needs to know that the connection is secure and private and not subject to a security breach during transfer (sometimes referred to as a man-in-the-middle attack). WTLS is necessary because mobile networks do not provide complete end-to-end security.
161	Application Security Chapter 6 in the book
162	Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Create keys. PGP creates your key pair, which is your public and private key. Manage keys. PGP allows you to store other users' public keys on a local key ring. Encrypt/decrypt e-mail. Colleagues use your public key to encrypt messages to you. You use your private key (or secret key) to decrypt those messages. Sign/authenticate e-mail. You use your private key to digitally sign messages to your colleagues. Your colleagues use your public key to decrypt your signature and verify that the message actually came from you.
163	Secure Electronic Messaging E-mail can literally be collected and read by almost anyone with a protocol analyzer (also called a data sniffer, network sniffer, packet sniffer, and other derivatives of these terms). In addition to a lack of privacy, e-mail can easily be forged. An attacker can modify the sender field of an e-mail message so that it can appear to come from anyone. The attacker can just as easily modify the reply field so that replies to the messages are sent to an address under her or his control. Many people today receive e-mail messages with unsolicited advertisements that seem to come from their own e-mail addresses. secure electronic messaging in this chapter and in many other technical documents refers generically to methods for encrypting and digitally signing e-mail
164	S/MIME Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) enables the encryption and digital signing of e-mail messages To utilize S/MIME, you must have an S/MIME-enabled application and access to a PKI certificate
165	E-Mail Vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities are often found in software, and e-mail software is no exception. Beyond product vulnerabilities, e-mail is often used to exploit other vulnerabilities. Such attacks can damage e-mail servers, erase e-mail or other data, or run other malicious software, resulting in loss of data, time, and money. One of the most widespread attacks launched through e-mail was the Melissa macro virus, which did two harmful things to users of Microsoft Outlook and Microsoft Word for Windows. First, it infected Word files stored on the victim's local system and garbled the documents. Second, the virus opened the victim's Microsoft Outlook address book and e-mailed itself to the first 50 addresses using the victim's e-mail address and account. This virus is estimated to have caused $80 million in damages. The creator of the virus was eventually caught and sentenced to 20 months in prison and a $5,000 fine. Numerous other exploits and vulnerabilities for a wide array of e-mail programs exist on networks around the world. To protect your network and your organization from e-mail vulnerabilities, you must vigilantly monitor security alerts and update virus-scanning software. E-mail gateway servers can scan incoming messages and isolate or remove virus attachments.
166	Spam install filtering software at gateway and client desktops Never respond to spam. This helps spammers confirm that they have a live e-mail address. They can then sell your address to other spammers. Don't post your address on your Web site. Addresses on Web sites can be "harvested" by automatic software that scans Web sites for e-mail addresses. Use a second e-mail address in newsgroups. Newsgroups are another location where spammers collect e-mail addresses. The address that you use for posting messages is likely to be used for spam. However, if you create a second address (called your public address) and use that for posting to newsgroups, you can expect spam on that account. This prevents spam from clogging your normal inbox. Don't provide your e-mail address without knowing how it will be used. Many Web sites ask you to log in with your e-mail address and a password. Be sure to look for a privacy statement regarding the information requested. Also, consider whether you trust the organization not to sell your information. If you can't find a privacy policy or you don't trust the organization not to sell your information, don't log in, sign up, or in any other way give them your address. Use a spam filter. Spam filters can help to reduce spam. Many products refer to spam filters as junk mail filters. Some let you create rules based on the subject, sender, or message body, allowing you to keep messages out of your inbox by moving or even deleting them. Never buy anything advertised in spam. Companies use spam because people respond to the advertisements.
167	SMTP Relay Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) relaying is what an e-mail server does when it transfers e-mail. Some spammers attempt to funnel their junk mail through other e-mail servers that permit SMTP relay. If spammers can forward mail from a server not normally linked to spam, they can get more spam to more people. When someone else's e-mail server is used for spam without permission, the act of spamming becomes an attack. Why? The victim's server is likely to slow down and will not be able to service e-mail as efficiently as before. More important, many ISPs are likely to block mail from the victim's e-mail server. This means the victim must discover the problem and then contact each ISP to explain that the mail server was attacked and convince them to unblock mail from their mail server. To protect your organization's servers from becoming a spammer's junk mail relay station, you must restrict access to SMTP relay. For example, most major ISPs typically protect themselves from being used for spamming attacks by restricting the use of SMTP servers to customers only. That way, if a customer account is used for spam, it can be locked out, stopping the spam. The spammer might even be tracked down and legally prosecuted. Noncustomer accounts are prevented from using the SMTP server at all.
168	Email Content E-mail scams are not new. Many scams that are carried out today over e-mail were propagated through letters and faxes before e-mail became popular. You can help reduce the propagation of e-mail hoaxes by educating users about how to recognize these hoaxes.
169	Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols were developed to help secure client/server exchanges on the Internet. Most people wouldn't write their credit card number, expiration date, and billing address on a postcard to make a purchase through the mail because they know anyone who saw their postcard could use this information to make fraudulent purchases against their accounts SSL/TLS provides protection against eavesdropping, tampering, and forgery of communications on the Internet. Clients and servers can authenticate one another over SSL connections and establish an encrypted communications link across the Internet.
170	SSL/TLS SSL/TLS is an application-independent layer that works between the Transport and Application Layers of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol stack
171	Authentication Authentication of the server to the client. When a customer wants to buy a product from a merchant's Web site, the customer wants to know that he or she is actually communicating with a server owned by that merchant. SSL/TLS allows the customer's computer to verify that the server is indeed the merchant's server (and not a rogue server set up by a thief to steal credit card information). For this to work, the server must have a valid certificate from a certification authority (CA) trusted by the client. Negotiation of a common cryptographic algorithm or cipher. The client and the server can negotiate the type of encryption used for the connection. This enables the client and server to agree on an encryption technique that they both support. Authentication of the client to the server (optional). When there is a desire to limit access to the server, client computers can be installed with certificates that confirm their identity. Such authentication isn't always desirable or necessary. For example, in most e-commerce transactions, merchants do not verify their customer's identity using SSL/TLS or certificates because many potential customers would not have certificates. Therefore, vendors frequently choose to identify their customers by credit card number, expiration date, and billing address. Use of asymmetric encryption to transfer shared secrets. Asymmetric (or public key) encryption is difficult to break, but is also computationally intensive. Symmetric encryption is much more efficient for transferring data. SSL/TLS utilizes asymmetric encryption to transfer a shared secret (symmetric key) so that the actual data encryption is faster, but the method of establishing the encrypted communication is still highly secure. Establish an encrypted connection. Finally, and most important, all communication between the client and server is encrypted. SSL/TLS is also protected by a mechanism to detect connection tampering, such as data being altered during transit.
172	HTTPS Web communications are conducted using HTTP. Web communications that are secured by SSL/TLS are referred to as HTTPS communications. Client Web browsers often indicate HTTPS connections by showing https:// (instead of http://) in the protocol field of the Web address. Although HTTPS encrypts communication between the client and server, it doesn't guarantee that the merchant is trustworthy or that the merchant's server is secure. SSL/TLS is designed to positively identify the merchant's server and encrypt communication between the client and server
173	Buffer Overflows An attacker can use a buffer overflow on the target system to exercise some type of control over that system Run programs as the least privileged account possible. If your application doesn't have to be equivalent to root or administrator, don't make it run as such. Use safe compilers to help minimize the impact of buffer overflows (for example, Stack Guard). Design the program to check all user input for validity. If done properly and thoroughly, users won't be able to send invalid or out-of-bound strings that can overflow the buffer to your program
174	Active Content Active content materials are small executables or script code that is rendered within the client's Web browser. For example, some banks offer mortgage calculators on their Web sites. These mortgage calculators are considered active content. Two of the most popular types of active content are JavaScript and ActiveX components. Active content that is intended to cause harm, but is disguised as something valuable or desirable, is called a Trojan horse
175	Threats From Web Sites Java is a programming language developed by Sun Microsystems that has a number of features that make it well suited for use on the Web. Small self-contained Java programs, called Java applets, can be run on most client Web browsers Netscape Corporation created JavaScript, a scripting language that shares many of the same structures and features of Java. However, Java and JavaScript were developed separately and are treated as two independent languages ActiveX components also provide dynamic content. ActiveX is a Microsoft technology targeted for Internet Explorer
176	Signing Active Content Microsoft employs a technology called Authenticode in Internet Explorer to check for digital signatures before downloading ActiveX components Users are notified in a pop-up dialog box that an applet or control is about to be installed. The digital signature of the component is matched to the service provider, so that clients can verify they are downloading the control from the correct service provider (and not an attacker-modified control that could do terrible things to their systems). The user is given a chance to cancel the installation of the ActiveX control through a pop-up dialog box
177	Cookies Cookies can also be used to compromise Web clients and servers in the following ways: An attacker could use a program such as Telnet to send a client browser any type of cookie the hacker wants. If a Web server relies on the information in the cookie to control access or services, the attacker could potentially formulate a cookie that bypasses that access control. Cookies can be manipulated or stolen. An attacker can use cookies to acquire inappropriate information about network users, the organization, or the security of the internal network. Attackers could use script injection (placing a script on the client's computer) to redirect cookies to the attacker's system. Hackers might also just eavesdrop on the connection reading cookies.
178	Protecting Cookie Exploits Do not configure a Web server to rely on information stored in a client's cookie to control access to resources or provide any additional services that could be used to exploit your Web server. Try not to store sensitive information, such as authentication credentials or bank account codes, in cookies. If you must store sensitive information in a cookie, use SSL/TLS to protect the information inside the cookie. This should help prevent the information from being intercepted and exploited by an attacker.
179	CGI applications Threats Running the CGI program over and over again from multiple Web browsers. Each time a CGI program runs, a new process (executing program) is started. This can tie up the Web server's system resources, causing it to slow down considerably. Exploiting default CGI programs that ship with Web servers. Many Web server products come with sample programs. If a sample program wasn't written with security in mind, an attacker could use it to exploit your Web server. Exploiting free or popularly available CGI programs. Attackers often study popular programs for security holes. Sending bogus data to CGI programs in an attempt to compromise the applications. Exploiting hidden fields within your CGI programs. Hidden fields are sometimes used to pass data between CGI applications through the client browser. The browser itself never displays the data (hence the name hidden field). However, the client could potentially read the hidden field as it is passed and modify the information as it is returned to the server. Using server-side includes (SSIs) to compromise scripts. SSIs can allow one document to be inserted into another. In addition, data can be fed into or out of another program if SSI is enabled where programs are stored. Attackers might be able to use SSI to compromise your scripts.
180	CGI programs protection Limit the use of CGI programs. CGI programs increase the workload of your Web server, which can cause it to respond slowly. Wherever possible, limit the use of CGI programs. Limit CGI programs to specific directories. This way you can control security permissions on those directories. Restrict access to those directories by configuring the fewest permissions possible for the fewest user accounts. Configure CGI programs to run as the least privileged user possible. Remove all default and sample programs from your Web server. Check all CGI applications for security holes, especially if they are free or popularly available. Only use CGI applications that are thoroughly tested and quality checked. Don't trust client applications to submit properly formatted data or the correct amount of data. Attackers might try to transmit bogus data or more data than you expect to exploit your CGI application. The CGI application must check the data returned and reject the data if it is invalid, too long, or improperly formatted. Don't trust a client-side script (JavaScript, for example) to protect CGI applications from improperly formatted data. If you allow a client-side application to preprocess data for your CGI program, an attacker might find a way around the preprocessor. For instance, the attacker might try sending data directly to the CGI application through another client application like Telnet. Don't trust preprocessing; ensure that the CGI application checks its own received data. Disable SSI. If your Web server must support SSI, turn them off on your script directories.
181	Instant Messaging Unencrypted data transfer. People often send what they consider confidential or private information using IM, such as user names, passwords, or trade secrets. However, many popular IM applications transfer unencrypted data that can be easily collected and read by attackers with protocol analyzers. Msgsnarf (included with dsniff) allows for the interception of IM messages. Transferred files might bypass virus scanners. Many IM applications allow users to transfer files directly. This often prevents virus scanners configured on the e-mail gateway from detecting viruses because the virus is in a file that was not transferred through e-mail. Attackers could exploit IM vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows. Like other applications, IM applications could have security holes, but these security holes are potentially more dangerous than those in other applications because connections are made directly from user to user through IM. If one of the IM users is an attacker, a security hole in IM can be exploited immediately. Problems were found in at least one IM application that allowed attackers to gain remote control of other IM users' computers. Attackers could attempt to trick people into divulging private information or running malicious programs. A persuasive attacker might convince a user to perform an unsafe action during a chat session. This type of attack is called social engineering because the attacker uses a social situation (human interaction) to compromise your network or organizational security. Some organizations protect themselves from potential IM application exploits by prohibiting the use of IM
182	FTP Client Security Issues There are two basic types of FTP servers: those that require authentication and those that allow anonymous FTP. FTP servers that use authentication require users to supply user names and passwords. Anonymous FTP servers do not require authentication and instead have users log on as "anonymous" and then enter their e-mail address as the password.
183	Secure FTP Secure FTP (SFTP, S/FTP, or S-FTP) supports SSL/TLS encryption for FTP communications. SSL/TLS encryption protects the transfer of the password and all data between the client and server. Both the FTP client and FTP server must have SFTP software to enable encrypted authentication and file transfers. Further, because SSL is used, a CA is required to issue a certificate to the client and server. SFTP software is available for all major operating systems. Many versions of SFTP are part of secure shell (SSH) software. In addition to SFTP, SSH provides encrypted versions of many remote administration utilities typically associated with administering UNIX systems.
184	Kerberized FTP Kerberized FTP is based on the Kerberos protocol developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Kerberos is a secure asymmetric encryption method that is used to encrypt client/server authentication. Kerberized FTP provides secure authentication between the FTP client and server and it also encrypts file transfers. To use Kerberized FTP, both the FTP client and FTP server must be Kerberized.
185	File Sharing Many client operating systems are capable of sharing files on the network. The Server Message Block (SMB) and Network File System (NFS) are two of the most popular file-sharing protocols. These protocols often ship as part of popular operating systems such as Microsoft Windows, UNIX, and Linux. Unfortunately many client systems are compromised because users are often unaware that these protocols are enabled. SMB is a file-sharing protocol often used for sharing resources in Microsoft networks. The revised version of SMB is called Common Internet File System (CIFS). Although SMB and CIFS are convenient ways for people to share files on a network, these shares are often exploitable targets for attackers NFS is a file-sharing protocol developed for UNIX-based operating systems. There are versions of NFS for non-UNIX operating systems, such as those from Novell and Microsoft There are many file-trading programs available
186	User Security Chapter 7
187	Authentication Something you know. A password or personal identification number (PIN) Something you have. A smart card or other physical object Something you are. A thumbprint or other biometrics
188	User Name and Password Authentication Force the users to have passwords that include uppercase and lowercase letters, symbols, and punctuation. Do not allow passwords that are all alphabetic or numeric characters. Force the users to change passwords every 180 days. If it appears that a password has been compromised, force the user to change the password immediately. For example, if a single user account is used to log on to multiple workstations simultaneously or within a short time interval, you might suspect that the account is compromised. Other potential indications that a user account is compromised include logons at unusual hours, attempts to access restricted resources, and multiple connections to resources that a user would not typically utilize. Do not allow users to use the same password again. If available, enable the histories function for passwords and do not allow the user to use the same password for at least five times. The longer the history the better. This, in concert with not allowing the user to change passwords too often, deters a user from quickly cycling through passwords to use the same one. Create a policy that does not allow users to write their passwords down. This is a written policy and cannot be enforced programmatically, but, if tied to disciplinary actions, it can deter users from recording their passwords. Create a policy that does not allow users to share their passwords with anyone, including help desk personnel. This policy cannot be enforced programmatically, but, if tied to disciplinary actions, it can also deter users. Provide user education Create and follow well-defined policies for verifying the identity of a user before resetting his or her password. To prevent a hacker from pretending to be a user and getting the password reset to attack the network with the user's account, use a process to validate the identity of the user. For example, you might call the user's manager to verify the request before changing the password.
189	Kerberos Authentication Kerberos is a network authentication protocol that provides strong authentication for client/server applications by using symmetric key cryptography. Kerberos is designed to provide a single sign-on to a heterogeneous environment Realm. An organizational boundary that is formed to provide authentication boundaries. Each realm has an authentication server (AS) and a ticket-granting server (TGS). Together the AS and TGS form a Key Distribution Center (KDC). All services and users in the realm receive tickets from the TGS and are authenticated with the AS. This provides a single source of authority to register and authenticate with. Realms can trust one another, providing the capability to scale Kerberos authentication. Authentication server (AS). In a Kerberos realm, the AS is the server that registers all valid users (clients) and services in the realm. The AS provides each client a ticket-granting ticket (TGT) that is used to request a ticket from a TGS. Ticket-granting server (TGS). To minimize the workload of the AS in a Kerberos realm, the TGS grants the session tickets used by clients to start a session with a service. The client must use the TGT issued by the AS to request a session ticket from a TGS. Cross-realm authentication. Cross-realm authentication is the capability of users in one realm to be authenticated and access services in another realm. This is accomplished by the user's realm registering a remote ticket-granting server (RTGS) on the realm of the service. Rather than having each realm authenticate with each other, cross-realm authentication can be configured in a hierarchical fashion. This eases authentication for the AS and TGS, but might force the client to contact several RTGSs to access a service. Remote ticket-granting server (RTGS). An RTGS performs the same tasks as a TGS, but for a remote realm (a realm the user is not associated with). To do this, the TGS in the realm the user is in must register with the TGS of the realm of the service the user is accessing (the RTGS). Ticket. A ticket is a block of data that allows users to prove their identity to a service. Each ticket is stored in a ticket cache on the user's local computer and is time stamped, so after a given amount of time (typically 10 hours), the ticket expires and is no longer valid. Limiting the length of time a ticket is valid reduces the chances of a hacker obtaining a ticket and being able to use it for unauthorized access. Ticket cache. A ticket cache is a portion of memory that stores all of a user's Kerberos tickets. This cache is separate from the cache of the application that is using the ticket. With the tickets in their own cache, users need only provide their credentials once per session, even if several applications are using that ticket to access a service. Ticket-granting ticket (TGT). A TGT is a ticket that is granted as part of the Kerberos authentication process and is stored in the ticket cache. The TGT is used to obtain other tickets that are specific to a service. For instance, if a user wanted to gain access to a specific service, his or her TGT would be used in a negotiation process to get the additional ticket. Each service requires its own ticket. Authenticators. A series of bits, a symbol, or a group of symbols that are inserted into a transmission or message in a predetermined manner and are then used for validation. Authenticators are typically valid for five minutes. This is similar to the use of a cookie for being authenticated on a Web site. An authenticator can only be used once. This help prevents someone from intercepting an authenticator and then reusing it. Principal. A principal is any unique entity to which Kerberos can assign tickets.
190	Same Realm The client contacts a TGS and requests a session ticket to access the service using its TGT. The client then accesses the service using the ticket the TGS provided
191	Mutual Authentication The term mutual authentication refers to the need for both the recipient and provider of a service to authenticate themselves to each other. Mutual authentication must be completed before the service can be provided. This assures the service that the user is who he or she claims to be and assures the user that he or she is connecting to the expected service. Kerberos allows a service to authenticate a recipient so that access to the service is protected. It also allows a service recipient to authenticate the service provider so that there is protection against rogue services. In addition to a server authenticating a user and a user authenticating a client, there is the mutual authentication option of a client and a server trusting a third party, such as a certificate authority.
192	Certificates Certificates provide the third-party trust in a mutual authentication scheme. A certificate is simply a block of data containing information used to identify a user. Information in the certificate includes the user's public key, information about the user, dates for which the certificate is valid, information about the issuer of a certificate, and a signature generated by the certificate issuer. A signature can be generated using a private key over a block of data to produce another block of data known as the signature. The generator of this signature using the private key is referred to as the signer. This signature can only be decrypted using the public key of the signer, thus providing assurance in the identity of the signer. A certificate is signed by a third-party certification authority (CA) so that if that CA says that the associated public key in the certificate is yours, any service you request can be assured that the public key is indeed yours and not from a hacker.
193	Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) is a protocol that can be used when a remote client needs to authenticate itself to a network server or when two routers need to authenticate themselves to each other to begin a Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) session. CHAP avoids transmission of the actual password on the established connection. The authentication process used by CHAP involves a three-way handshake in which the network access server (NAS) sends a challenge to the client consisting of the session ID and a random string of data to the remote client. The remote client uses a Message Digest 5 (MD5) function hash to return the following information: The user name An encrypted challenge A session ID A password
194	Tokens A token is a device that can be issued to a user for use in the authentication process. For example, there are token devices that, when enabled, synchronize with a server. Each minute the numbers in the server and on the device change to a predetermined number, as long as the battery in the device is working. For a user to authenticate, he or she must type in the number on the display, which must match the number in the server for the user to be authenticated. Tokens are often small handheld devices, with or without keypads, that can range in size from a credit card to a small pocket calculator. Among other forms, they can be smart cards with small computer chips in them, requiring a reader when used with a PC. One type of authentication process used with hardware tokens involves a challenge-response process: Enter your user name at a workstation and send it to the authentication server. The server responds with a challenge to the token. You reply using the token (or information provided by the token). The server validates the information you provided and authenticates you.
195	Biometrics Biometric authentication is an automated method of identifying a person based on a physical characteristic, such as a thumbprint or the retina of his or her eye. Using this type of authentication requires comparing a registered sample against a new captured biometric sample, for example, a fingerprint captured during a logon. The biometric authentication mechanism typically has two modes, enrolling and verifying. Enrolling For initial use of the biometric, a system administrator must enroll each user to verify that each individual being enrolled is authorized. The enrolling process includes storing the user's biological feature that will be used later to verify the user's identity. This is typically acquired by using a sensor (hardware device) that can record the particular feature, such as a thumbprint scanner.
196	Biometrics Operations Performance and reliability. This is not how fast the biometric device can perform the scan, but how well it performs the authentication process. Although device manufacturers provide information on the performance of their devices, the number of people used for the test and the assumptions for what environment the sensor will be used in vary. Reliability is typically determined by calculating the crossover error rate (CER), which is the point at which the false rejection rate (FRR) and false acceptance rate (FAR) are equal. The lower the CER the better. The FRR represents the percentage of authorized users who are incorrectly rejected, also called type 1 errors. The FAR represents the percentage of unauthorized users who are incorrectly identified as valid users, also called type 2 errors. Difficulty. User education should be a consideration when selecting a biometric authentication device. If the device is too difficult to use, the user might have trouble using it for authentication. Also, it can easily take a user a few weeks to adjust to using the device, and during that time the FRR rate will be higher. User capability. Some users might have an impairment that will not allow them to use a particular biometric device for authentication. You must provide a device that can be used by the majority of your users, and then provide an alternative device or authentication mechanism for those who cannot use the primary method. Acceptance. You users might consider some devices too invasive. Select a solution that will be palatable to your users, preferably a noninvasive biometric with continuous authentication, such as iris recognition. Cost. Some biometrics cost more to implement due to their complexity. Additionally, the cost of the individual scanning devices can vary greatly. For example, fingerprint-scanning devices are relatively inexpensive compared to iris scanning devices.
197	Combining Authentication Methods There are multiple authentication methods available, and the security offered by combining methods to form a multifactor authentication process is much greater than using any single authentication method.
198	Understanding Access Control Models Discretionary access control (DAC). The owner of an object (such as a process, file, or folder) manages access control at his or her own discretion. Mandatory access control (MAC). Access to an object is restricted based on the sensitivity of the object (defined by the label that is assigned), and granted through authorization (clearance) to access that level of data. Role-based access control (RBAC). Access is based on the role a user plays in the organization. For instance, a human resources manager would need access to information that a department manager would not need access to, and both would need access to some common information.
199	DAC Discretionary access control DAC - Discretionary access control is used by the owner of a file to restrict a user's access to that file. With DAC, an access control list (ACL) is maintained that lists the users with access and what type of access they have. ACLs can be stored as part of the file, in a file, or in a database. These risks are inherent because there is no centralized administration, as each file owner controls the access level to his or her personal files. Some owners might not be security conscious, and as a result, they might either inadvertently or intentionally allow all users to modify any file they own. : Software might be executed or updated by unauthorized personnel. Confidential information might be accidentally or deliberately compromised by users who are not intended to have access. Auditing of file and resource accesses might be difficult.
200	Mandatory Access Control -MAC Mandatory access control is a nondiscretionary control also known as multilevel security. You classify all users and resources and assign a security label to the classification. Access requests are denied if the requestor's security label does not match the security label of the resource. MAC is typically used only by organizations with high security requirements and clear policies and procedures, such as the military. A classification level specifies the level of trust associated with the resource, and there are three major classification levels: top secret, confidential, and unclassified. Classification levels have an implicit level of trust with higher classifications. For example, confidential classification has an implicit trust with top secret; therefore a person with top secret access also has access to resources that are labeled as confidential. Access is granted to the user if his or her classification is equal to or higher than the classification of the resource he or she wishes to access. MAC techniques reduce the need for you to maintain ACLs because the access decision logic is built into the classification hierarchy. Although MAC and RBAC assume a set of formal rules, they differ in the management approach. With MAC, information is categorized according to sensitivity and not subject matter. Data about the same general subject matter can have multiple sensitivity ratings. People and processes within this type of management structure are determined by the kinds of sensitivity levels they are allowed to access.
201	Role-based Access Control In role-based access control, information is categorized according to subject matter, which might reflect some sensitivity criteria inherent in the environment. Persons and processes are identified for access to the information by the role they play within the enterprise. For example, people in the budget department could access and use sensitive budget data, whereas people in other parts of the enterprise would be denied access to such information. RBAC is an alternative to DAC and MAC, giving you the ability to specify and enforce enterprise-specific security policies in a way that maps naturally to an organization's structure. Each user is assigned one or more roles, and each role is assigned one or more privileges that are given to users in that role. You can assign a collection of users to a single role. For example, you might assign an administrative role to one or more system administrators responsible for maintaining your enterprise server. Roles are mapped to a particular resource or a particular user group. When roles are mapped to a resource, the resource name defined in the role is verified and then it is determined if access is permitted to proceed. When roles are mapped to a group, the role group is compared with the group associated with a resource to determine whether the operation is permitted to proceed. Such role-based access control requires that a list of roles be maintained and that mappings from role to user or user group be established.
202	Security Baselines Chapter 8
203	Network Device and Operating System Hardening Operating System Check The Web for The latest! Network Device Updates The processing logic of network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls is typically maintained through firmware updates, programs that update the current processing logic (or operating system) of the device
204	Verifying Updates Yes, But How! Maintaining an Archive of Updates No matter how you receive updates for your applications, network devices, and operating systems, you should consider building an archive of update files. Maintain all of the updates that you must apply for each type of software and hardware your organization uses. This allows you to quickly reapply updates when new systems are brought in or existing systems require reinstallation. Testing Updates Always test updates on nonproduction systems, if possible. This allows you to determine if the update performs properly before you load it onto your production devices, because software vendors can rarely guarantee that updates won't break other applications that you might be using on a production computer. If you don't have a test system for trying out patches, make sure you have an action plan for restoring your production systems if the security patch causes a problem. Applying Updates After you verify and test updates, apply them as soon as possible. The actual process for applying firmware updates varies depending on the product and vendor, but typically it is not much more involved than downloading and running a file from the vendor's Web site.
205	SAN Top 20 Operating System and Application Updates The SANS Institute has created a list of the top 20 security exploits (http://www.sans.org/top20.htm).
206	Updates Automated Updates Many software vendors are providing methods for receiving and applying updates automatically. Many virus scanner vendors offer automated programs for updating virus definition files. Microsoft offers an automatic updates program called Software Update Services for many of its operating systems. These automated updates can be configured to automatically download updates from the vendor's Web site on a regular schedule or whenever they are available.
207	Disabling Unnecessary Network Services and Protocols People often speak of disabling unnecessary "services" and "protocols" interchangeably. This is because services and protocols often have the same name. For example, the Simple Network Removing Unnecessary Programs
208	Disabling Unnecessary Protocol Stacks TCP/IP is often referred to as a protocol stack. Other types of protocol stacks include IPX/SPX and NetBEUI. Many operating systems and network devices are capable of running more than one protocol stack. As with removing an unnecessary service or protocol, you should also remove any unnecessary protocol stacks. At a minimum, removing unnecessary services, protocols, and protocol stacks improves performance and makes systems less complex to troubleshoot.
209	Disabling Promiscuous Mode Attackers who are able to compromise one of the systems on your network might use that compromised system to gather information and possibly exploit other systems. One way in which an attacker might gather information is to install a protocol analyzer program on the compromised system. The attacker then uses the protocol analyzer to monitor data packets, hoping to find passwords, user names, or additional information that might help to compromise other systems. To protect your systems from this type of attack, you must do all you can to ensure that a system is not compromised in the first place. However, if a system is compromised, one method for stopping the attacker from gathering additional information is to disable the promiscuous mode of the network card. Promiscuous mode is a condition that a network adapter can be placed in to gather all passing information. Normally, network adapters do not gather information that is not specifically destined for the adapter or broadcast to all adapters. Certain programs (such as protocol analyzer programs) place adapters into promiscuous mode.
210	Disabling Unnecessary Systems Computer systems that are not in use on your network should be disabled. Network attacks are often launched against test systems that were never properly secured and then forgotten about. Even a test system that has no legitimate user accounts locally could be quite useful to an attacker. As previously mentioned, if an attacker compromises an unsecured system, she or he could install a protocol analyzer and other tools that could lead to further exploits. To protect your network from exploits launched against systems that are not in use, you must routinely audit your systems. You can use vulnerability scanners on your own network to scan for unsecured systems, and you can also physically inspect your network to see if there are any computers or other network devices that are no longer in use.
211	Access Control Lists Packet filtering is typically accomplished with an access control list (ACL). An ACL is a rule list that tells the router or firewall how to deal with network packets the router receives, so routers and firewalls use ACLs to determine which packets to forward and which to drop. One common problem with router and firewall configurations is that packet filters are not stringent enough
212	File System Security File and directory permissions Data encryption Shared or exported data
213	Operating System Hardening Disable unnecessary programs and processes. Disable unnecessary services. Disable unnecessary protocols. Verify, test, and install all vendor patches. Use vulnerability scanners to identify potential security weaknesses. Disable promiscuous mode. Configure file system security according to the rule of least privilege.
214	File Systems Vulnerabilities are often discovered in network devices, operating systems, and applications. You should monitor for security alerts to ensure that you know about exploits that could affect your equipment. Be sure to verify, test, and apply all security updates as soon as possible. To better protect your network devices and hosts, you should do the following: Disable unnecessary programs and processes. Disable unnecessary services. Disable unnecessary protocols. Verify, test, and install all vendor patches. Use vulnerability scanners to identify potential security weaknesses. Disable promiscuous mode. Choose secure file systems that allow you to set file- and folder-level permissions. Configure file system permissions according to the rule of least privilege. In addition to removing all unnecessary components and applying security updates, additional steps to secure operating systems, beyond those already discussed, include the following: Set complex passwords for all user accounts and change them frequently. Set account lockout policies. Remove or disable all unnecessary modems. Enable monitoring, logging, auditing, and detection. Maintain backups and disk images.
215	More Set complex passwords for all user accounts and change them frequently. Be sure to routinely change passwords to keep them secure. Set account lockout policies. If someone is trying to guess a password, they'll probably take a few guesses. If you have an account lockout policy that locks someone out after three to five attempts, the chances of that person guessing a password successfully are greatly reduced. Remove or disable all unnecessary modems. Modems (or dial-up adapters) can become a way to circumvent the security of your network monitoring, logging, auditing, and detection. You should monitor your hosts and connectivity devices. Many operating systems allow you to log user access, file system access, and other security-related events. You can also configure a host-based intrusion detection system. Maintain backups and images. One of the most important ways to protect your operating systems is by backing them up. You can also use disk-imaging software to maintain a complete image of the operating system and its data.
216	Server Application Hardening Watch out for buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Buffer overflows are historically the most frequent type of exploit discovered. Tracking and applying the latest security updates, as mentioned in Lesson 1, is the appropriate method for handling buffer overflows. Research issues specific to your server and its applications. Learn about the discovered vulnerabilities concerning the applications and services you are making available. Keep informed of security alerts. Subscribe to one or more vulnerability alert services that notify people of discovered exploits and solutions for your specific server application. Test, verify, and apply security updates as soon as they are made available. Enable logging mechanisms on your server. You should keep a record of people who visit your server and what they do on it. Review the log to see what is happening and investigate anything that is inappropriate, such as entries that show someone is trying to access operating system files through one of your services or applications. Use encryption appropriately. To protect the transfer of sensitive or private information, ensure that encryption is enabled between the server and client. Maintain a backup. Keep an up-to-date backup copy of your server and the applications and services it is providing so that you can quickly recover from successful attacks. Use vulnerability scanning tools. Some software vendors and security-related organizations produce vulnerability scanning tools designed for specific types of servers. For example, Microsoft Corporation has the IISLockDown Wizard, which is a utility that fixes common security issues with Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) servers.
217	Web Servers Many organizations use Web servers to provide information and services to the public and internally on their private networks. Web servers that provide services to the public are typically referred to as Internet Web servers or public Web servers; those providing services to the private network are called intranet Web servers or private Web servers. Internet Web servers are typically considered to be at greater risk because they are exposed to a larger number of anonymous users. For this reason, Internet Web servers are typically located in a perimeter networks (also known as a DMZ, demilitarized zone, or screened subnet), whereas intranet Web servers are typically located on the internal network. All of the security considerations mentioned in this section can be applied equally to either type of Web server. There are many different software vendors that provide Web servers today. In addition, many applications come with the added ability to share documents or information over a Web protocol [Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)], effectively making them Web servers. So many exploits exist for Web servers that entire books are dedicated to securing Web services. The text that follows includes a brief discussion of three potential Web server exploits: packet sniffing, directory
218	Web Packet Sniffing Web clients typically contact Web servers over the well-known TCP port 80. The port the Web server sends information to is dynamically negotiated during the TCP handshake. Normal HTTP communications are not encrypted and can be easily captured and decoded by a protocol analyzer. Methods for encrypting Directory Listing Automatic directory listings, enabled by some Web servers, allow a client browser to see the contents of a directory when no default document is specified or available. A default document is the page that is loaded when a client navigates to a specific directory. For example, many Web servers specify a default document of index.html. When a client browser makes a connection to the Web server, the default document is loaded. However, if the client connects directly to a subdirectory without a default document, the client sees a listing of files and folders that is in the subdirectory. Attackers might use this feature to browse your Web server's directory structure and available files, which is called directory enumeration. To help prevent directory enumeration, disable automatic directory listings. Once this is done, your Web server posts an error message when the default document cannot be found.
219	8.3 Compatible File Names Microsoft Windows 32-bit operating systems support two types of file names. The first type is called a long file name (LFN), which allows for file names of up to 255 characters. The second is the 8.3 compatible file name, which allows for eight-character file names plus a three-character file extension. Figure 8-5 illustrates a file named Longfilename.txt and its 8.3 compatible file name Longfi~1.txt.
220	General Tips for Securing a Web Server Reduce features. Although you might want to provide a highly engaging and interactive Web site, you must consider that every additional feature is another potential point for compromise. Remove all unnecessary plug-ins, scripts, programs, and other features that are not required on the Web server. Secure available features. For the scripts, programs, and plug-ins that you do decide to use on your Web site, be sure to follow all appropriate cautions. Use the appropriate security for all directories, files, and objects. For example, Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts should be placed in their own directory and should not be run by the system account. Only read and execute permissions should be enabled for the least privileged user account possible for running CGI programs. Place public Web servers in your perimeter network. Isolate your public Web servers from the rest of your internal network by placing them in a perimeter network. If someone compromises your Web server, you want to protect the rest of the network from being compromised through that Web server. Protect your internal network by restricting or denying access to intranet Web servers. Web services are offered over the standard HTTP TCP port 80 or HTTPS TCP port 443. If you want to block standard Web communications, you should be sure that these ports are blocked on the firewall. Carefully choose your Web directories. You should make your Web root directory (the directory location where users connect by default) a directory that does not include files or folders that contain operating system files or sensitive data
221	FTP Servers Incorrectly configured FTP directory structure. Some administrators incorrectly configure their FTP server's structure to include files that they did not intend to be available over FTP, such as operating system files or private data. Allowing write permissions. Some organizations allow users write permission to their servers intentionally, and others do so by mistake. Attackers search for directories on FTP servers that allow write access. Software traders utilize improperly configured FTP directories to exchange software with others. Sniffing password exchanges between FTP server and client. FTP clients contact FTP servers over TCP port 21 to begin communications. By default, FTP communications are not encrypted and this can be easily decoded by a protocol analyzer. FTP servers that require authentication could allow for the compromise of user names and passwords, as attackers can sniff the network and capture user names and passwords. FTP bounce. There is an FTP exploit that allows attackers to run scans against other computers through your FTP server, called an FTP bounce.
222	Securing an FTP server Place public FTP servers in your perimeter network. Isolate your public FTP servers from the rest of your internal network by placing them in a perimeter network. If someone compromises your FTP server, you want to protect the rest of the network from being compromised through that FTP server. Protect your internal network by restricting or denying access to intranet FTP servers. FTP services are typically offered over TCP ports 21 and 20. If you want to block standard FTP communications, you should be sure to block these ports on the firewall. Don't allow unauthenticated write access. Configure encrypted authentication for your FTP servers. You can use S/FTP or Kerberized FTP to secure the user name and password exchanges. You can also configure a VPN to secure communications between any client and server. Check your FTP directories. You should routinely check or scan your FTP file structure for unusual or unexpected files and folders.
223	E-Mail Servers E-mail servers are typically compromised in the following ways: Packet sniffing. E-mail generally moves through the Internet and other networks between e-mail servers, and also between e-mail clients and servers. E-mail servers relay e-mail to one another over the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) that uses TCP port 25. E-mail clients most commonly check e-mail using one of two protocols: the Post Office Protocol version 3 (POP3) or Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP). POP3 clients contact the e-mail server on TCP port 110 and IMAP clients contact the e-mail server on TCP port 143. By default, these network communications are not encrypted and data can be intercepted with a protocol analyzer. DoS attacks. DoS attacks against e-mail servers typically involve programming flaws that cause them to stop responding for some reason when certain data is sent to them. A DoS attack can also occur when users on a network receive and execute a virus that overburdens the e-mail server with traffic. Open relays. E-mail servers and other types of servers sometimes act as SMTP relay servers. This is convenient for users and other servers that need to transmit e-mail. However, it is also a security issue because people who send spam seek out SMTP relays.
224	To protect your e-mail servers Use virus scanners. You should configure virus-scanning programs on all client and server computers on which e-mail is accessed. E-mail is a popular transmission method for viruses and other malicious software. Use an e-mail relay or e-mail gateway to protect your mail server. E-mail relays or e-mail gateways can be used to scan, clean, and filter e-mail before it reaches your e-mail server. These products typically run on separate secured servers and reduce the amount of e-mail that your server has to process. The e-mail relay or gateway can be used to filter potential virus attachments, spam, and other undesirable or suspicious e-mail. Check for, and close, open e-mail relays. There are scanning programs that you can use on your own network to check for open SMTP relay services so you can find them before spammers
225	General Tips for Securing a Web Server Reduce features. Although you might want to provide a highly engaging and interactive Web site, you must consider that every additional feature is another potential point for compromise. Remove all unnecessary plug-ins, scripts, programs, and other features that are not required on the Web server. Secure available features. For the scripts, programs, and plug-ins that you do decide to use on your Web site, be sure to follow all appropriate cautions. Use the appropriate security for all directories, files, and objects. For example, Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts should be placed in their own directory and should not be run by the system account. Only read and execute permissions should be enabled for the least privileged user account possible for running CGI programs. Place public Web servers in your perimeter network. Isolate your public Web servers from the rest of your internal network by placing them in a perimeter network. If someone compromises your Web server, you want to protect the rest of the network from being compromised through that Web server. Protect your internal network by restricting or denying access to intranet Web servers. Web services are offered over the standard HTTP TCP port 80 or HTTPS TCP port 443. If you want to block standard Web communications, you should be sure that these ports are blocked on the firewall. Carefully choose your Web directories. You should make your Web root directory (the directory location where users connect by default) a directory that does not include files or folders that contain operating system files or sensitive data. If possible, don't put your Web server files and your operating system files on the same physical volume. Also, don't store sensitive or private data on your Web server.
226	SNA Servers Snooping around the DNS server. Anyone can query DNS, so limit the information you maintain there. Stealing zone transfers. DNS servers are often configured to provide other DNS servers with updates. The DNS server receiving the update is typically referred to as a secondary server. The purpose of the secondary DNS server is to maintain a backup copy of the DNS database and to provide name resolution services for client computers. An attacker could potentially receive a zone transfer and use it to help map out your network and search for potential targets. Zone update spoofing. An attacker can potentially spoof the address of the real primary DNS server and send a bogus update to a secondary DNS server. Client computers using that falsely updated DNS server would receive incorrect information and network communications could be redirected to a location controlled by the attacker. DNS spoofing. The dsniff utility, mentioned in Chapter 6, has a subordinate tool called dnsspoof that allows an attacker to set up a bogus DNS server to answer client systems. If the DNS server is spoofed, clients receive bogus information when they request name resolutions. This enables the attacker to redirect traffic. Dynamic DNS (DDNS) record spoofing. DDNS record spoofing allows client computers to update DNS with their name and IP address. Attackers could use DDNS to overwrite records that belong to other systems, or at least put bogus records in the DNS server. DNS cache poisoning. DNS servers maintain caches of IP name resolutions, allowing the DNS server to quickly answer a DNS name query that it has previously answered. Flaws have been found in some DNS servers that allow attackers to insert bogus information into a DNS cache. This exploit is referred to as DNS cache poisoning.
227	Securing DNS Use a separate DNS server for the perimeter network. Don't put any information in your publicly accessible DNS server that you don't want to the public to see. Restrict information in DNS. Limit the amount of additional information you provide in DNS. Although DNS allows you to store additional host information in HINFO records, consider how an attacker could use that information. Limit zone transfers. Configure your DNS servers to only allow zone transfers to specific secondary servers. Secure zone transfers. Berkeley Internet Name Domain version 9 (BIND 9), a DNS version maintained by the Internet Software Consortium (ISC), allows zone transfers to be signed. Zone transfer signing allows secondary servers to verify the credentials of the primary server. Microsoft's Windows 2000 DNS implementation is integrated with its directory services architecture, which allows servers to verify credentials before accepting data. Secure dynamic updates. Microsoft's Windows 2000 DNS implementation allows for a cross-check of client computer credentials before allowing an update to take place. BIND version 9 is capable of supporting signed DNS updates from clients. Implementing either method gives you a more secure dynamic update because client credentials are established before an update is allowed. You can also choose to disable dynamic updates and instead enter IP addresses manually. Use Secure DNS. Both BIND 9 and Microsoft's Windows 2000 version of DNS implement DNS security, which allows client systems to be sure that they are communicating with the correct DNS server, which prevents DNS spoofing. Prevent cache poisoning. The correction for DNS cache poisoning is to get an updated version or security patch for your DNS server that does not allow the DNS cache to be poisoned.
228	File and Print Servers Attackers can use both NFS and SMB/NetBIOS file and printer shares to gain inappropriate information and access to your network in the following ways: Enumerating resources. Attackers attempt to make unauthenticated connections to shared resources on the network. Exploiting incorrectly configured shares. Shares that are made available to anyone are easy targets for attackers. If permissions are configured incorrectly or too much permission is available for an easily exploited user account, attackers can do plenty of harm. Packet sniffing. Attackers might try to read data (printer files or data files) as they traverse the network.
229	Securing File and Print Servers Block access to shares and related information at the firewall. Administrators commonly block TCP/UDP ports 137, 138, and 139, which are commonly used for NetBIOS names and sessions. Administrators also block NFS TCP/UDP port 2049. This prevents many of the exploits discussed in this section by preventing external attackers from making connections to internally shared resources. Use the highest security and authentication levels available. Some systems allow you to use varying levels of authentication strength. For more secure configurations, use stronger authentication Verify share security. Use the rule of least privilege to secure your shares. If possible, further secure data beyond the share by limiting access using file system permissions or encryption. Use VPNs. If you need to secure the data transmitted between clients and servers, use a VPN to encrypt communications, as
230	DHCP provides IP addresses automatically to client computers Rogue DHCP server. An attacker can use a rogue DHCP server to subvert client communications. Some DHCP servers even provide the address of the DNS server. If an attacker is able to configure a client computer with a bogus IP address, the attacker can misdirect the client to resources controlled by the attacker. Leasing legitimate addresses to attackers. Attackers get a foothold on your network when they obtain a legitimate IP address. They immediately learn part of your internal addressing scheme and could make use of the address to attack other systems on your network. Consider the following solutions to these issues: Scan for rogue DHCP servers. You can use a protocol analyzer or configure an intrusion-detection system to discover DHCP Offer packets from unauthorized DHCP servers. Configure DNS server information at the client. Client computers that have a preconfigured DNS address ignore additional options, such as DNS server IP address. If you set the DNS IP address on the client computer, a rogue DHCP server is unable to trick a client computer into calling a bogus DNS server. Restrict address leases. You can configure most DHCP servers not to lease addresses to unknown adapters. Typically, you configure all of the allowed media access control (MAC) addresses as address reservations for your DHCP clients to prevent the server from leasing addresses to unknown systems. Block DHCP at the firewall. DHCP and Boot Protocol (BOOTP) operate over TCP/UDP ports 67 and 68
231	NNTP Servers NNTP allows news clients to connect to news servers to read and post messages. some ways to protect your organization from NNTP server exploits: Block NNTP on the firewall. If you have a private NNTP server that should not be accessible to external users, block the NNTP port TCP/UDP 119 at the firewall. Require authentication and encryption. If you are posting private information on an NNTP server, you should protect that information. Some NNTP servers allow you to configure user authentication that prevents anonymous or unauthenticated users from connecting to and browsing your NNTP server. You can also configure encrypted communications using Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) or set up a VPN between NNTP clients and servers to prevent packet sniffing of sensitive data. Watch what you post. Don't post items on a public NNTP server that could compromise your network. If you manage an NNTP server, don't allow others to post sensitive information to the public.
232	More Data Repositories Data repositories are locations that hold information about your network or organization, such as user accounts, computer accounts, directories, maps, and so on. Attackers can use the information stored in data repositories to formulate attacks against your organization. Therefore, you must ensure that this information is as limited and restricted as possible, while still meeting the informational needs of your organization. Most techniques to protect this information involve authentication and encryption. The following sections cover securing directory services and databases. Directory Services In computer networking, a directory service is any information storage and retrieval process that provides information about an organization's network. The information in a directory service can include computer accounts, user accounts, mail accounts, service locations, and shared resource information. The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a common directory service on many networks today that organizes data in a hierarchical fashion. The top of the hierarchy is called the LDAP root. The LDAP
233	Protect your LDAP hierarchy The two most popular versions of LDAP are version 2 (LDAP v2) and version 3 (LDAP v3). Both versions support anonymous and simple authentication, which are not very secure. Anonymous authentication doesn't require a password at all, and simple authentication uses a password, but it is transmitted unencrypted over the network, meaning an attacker could use a protocol analyzer to compromise it. Strong authentication over LDAP v2 is provided through Kerberos version 4 authentication. Strong authentication over LDAP v3 is provided through Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) communications defined in RFC 2222. Configure the strongest authentication that your version of LDAP supports to better protect your LDAP hierarchy. Utilize encryption. Secure LDAP (LDAPS, formerly known as sldap) allows you to encrypt communications using SSL/TLS. Block access to LDAP ports from the Internet. LDAP communications travel over TCP/UDP port 389, and LDAPS communications travel over TCP/UDP port 636. Be sure that attackers cannot listen to or make connections using these ports.
234	Databases database servers can be exploited in the following ways: Unexpected data queries or commands. Many database servers use Structured Query Language (SQL), which allows for the querying and posting of data. A SQL-savvy attacker might use SQL commands to make your database server do things that you didn't expect or want it to do. This is known as SQL injection. Unauthenticated access. If you allow unauthenticated access to your database server, attackers can more easily connect to and attempt to exploit your database server. Packet sniffing. Attackers might sniff data that is transferred to and from the database server.
235	Securing database server: Run test queries. Test the database to see if you can submit extraneous queries and attempt to access unauthorized information. Use stored procedures. Instead of having Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) or Active Server Pages (ASP) build SQL query strings from user input, use stored procedures to prevent SQL injection. Configure authenticated access. Don't allow unauthenticated connections to your database server, whenever possible. Use the strongest authentication that your database server allows. Encrypt data transfers. If you are transferring private data to or from your database server, consider using an SSL/TLS connection or VPN to protect the data. Block database ports at the firewall. If your database server should not be queried by external entities, block access to it on the firewall. Different database servers utilize different TCP/UDP ports to transfer information. Check your specific database to determine which ports you should block.
236	Operational Security Chapter 9
237	Physical Security Network resources must be protected physically as well as technically. Proper physical security uses concentric rings of increasingly strong barriers as you approach the central ring. Biometric technologies provide an additional method for identifying and verifying users. Social engineering is the process of circumventing security barriers by persuading authorized users to provide passwords or other sensitive information. Fire suppression systems using inert gas minimize the damage caused by fire and firefighting techniques. Wireless networking presents additional security problems that can be minimized by judicious selection of power settings and careful antenna placement. Regular backups with offsite storage are an essential element of any disaster recovery plan. Maintaining mirror servers at distant sites provides an immediate failover capability.
238	Physical Barriers The actual nature of the physical barriers used to secure networking equipment is also an important consideration. Typical office construction standards hollow doors, flimsy drywall, and drop ceilings might defeat the casual intruder, but they are easily penetrated by the determined interloper. A state-of-the-art electronic combination lock is of little value when someone can easily put a fist through the wall or crawl over the doorway through a drop ceiling into the secured area. The inner rings of your security area should provide protection on all six sides of the room, meaning that doors should be solid and walls should be reinforced and run vertically from slab to slab, through drop ceilings and raised floors. In some cases, even these precautions might be insufficient against intruders with heavy tools; an alarm system or security cameras can provide additional protection.
239	Biometrics Fingerprint matching. The fingerprint scan is the oldest biometric technology and still one of the most popular. Because every individual's fingerprints are unique, fingerprint scans can be used for identification or verification. The image enhancement technologies developed over the years have helped to eliminate many of the problems that resulted from inadequate scanning or variances in finger pressure and position during the scan. Hand geometry. Hand geometry is a verification technique based on a scan of an individual's hand shape, taking into account various characteristics, such as length, thickness, and curvature of fingers. An individual's hand geometry is not unique, however, as fingerprints are, so this technique cannot be used for identification, only for verification. However, hand geometry scans are much faster, cleaner, and less invasive than fingerprint scans, making them a much more convenient mechanism. Iris scans. A scan of the eyeball's iris pattern is usable for both verification and identification. The iris is the colored part of the eye surrounding the pupil. Iris scans are based on a high-resolution photograph of the eye taken from a distance of less than three feet. The pattern of the iris does not change over a person's lifetime and is unaffected by eyeglasses or contact lenses, making it a very reliable form of verification and identification that is almost impossible to mask or imitate.
240	More Retinal scans. The retina is found on the rear of the eyeball, and it contains a pattern of veins that is unique to each individual. Even identical twins have different retinal patterns. More accurate than virtually any other biometric technology, including iris scanning, retinal scans are more invasive, requiring the individual to look directly into an infrared light, which shines through the eyeball, illuminating the anterior surface. Speech recognition. Voice pattern matching is one of the more complex biometric functions, and it is also easier to spoof (with recordings) than the other technologies listed here. The process of matching voice patterns involves the creation of a voice model for the individual to be authenticated. The voice model is a baseline pattern that accounts for the variations in utterances spoken by the same person at different times. Face recognition and facial thermograms. Facial recognition systems and thermograms are not yet as accurate as fingerprints and other unique human attributes, but they have the potential to become a fast and uninvasive biometric verification system
241	Environment Fire Suppression Protecting sensitive equipment from theft and maintaining proper operating conditions is important, but fire is a major threat to the continued operation of network equipment. The damage caused by fire, and by standard firefighting techniques, can cause not only data and equipment loss, but also damage to the facilities themselves that can take a long time to repair before replacement equipment can even be installed. For large installations, a fire suppression system should be mandatory in the data center or server room. In the event of a fire, these systems flood the room with an inert gas, displacing the oxygen that the fire needs to burn. This puts the fire out quickly and prevents firefighters from destroying electronic equipment with water or foam. Unfortunately, these systems also displace the oxygen that people need to breathe, so evacuation alarms and emergency air supplies are also a necessary part of the system. Halon compounds were the fire suppression gases of choice for many years, until they were found to damage the ozone layer. Now, they are in the process of being phased out in most countries around the world. Today, Dupont markets a line of replacement products, such as FE-13 and FE-36, that are safer for the environment and less toxic to humans. These types of chemical fire suppressants are well suited for electrical fires
242	Disaster Recovery In a security context, a disaster is any occurrence that can prevent your network from operating normally or prevent your company from doing business. Disasters can be as simple as a hard disk failure or as catastrophic as a hurricane, and a properly designed network has a plan in place that covers both these extremes and everything in between. Backups Backing up your data should be the first thing that comes to mind when you think of disaster recovery. Making regular backups and testing them by performing regular restores is basic, but it is only the beginning of a good disaster recovery plan. In most cases, network administrators use backups to recover files that were accidentally deleted. This is a simple task, in that you simply use the same software that created the backup in the first place. Beyond that, however, everyone understands that backups are also protection against disk failures, computer thefts, or disasters in which a computer is damaged or destroyed. Restoring from a backup in these events is more complicated, because you must first install the operating system and the backup software before you can even access the data stored on your backup tapes or other media.
243	Privilege Management Rather than assign privileges to individual users, operating systems typically enable administrators to create groups, of which users are members. Privileges granted to a group are inherited by all of its members. Creating groups is a matter of determining which users need to have the same privileges. Centralized management, in the form of directory services and other single sign-on applications, has simplified the privilege management process by enabling administrators to create one account for each user, instead of many. Auditing enables administrators to track the privileges granted to a user, the resources that the user has accessed, and the overall usage of a resource
244	Using Groups How many groups should we create? What should the groups be called? What criteria should we use when creating groups of users? How many users should there be in each group? What privileges should be assigned to each group?
245	Creating Groups When creating groups, the obvious intent is to group users together that have the same needs. If the workers in the Order Entry department all need to look up names in the customer database, it's common sense to create a group with a name such as Order Entry and grant that group the privileges needed to read the database. This is known as role-based privilege management Group management is rarely as simple as this example, however. You might have a large number of order entry workers who must be able to read the customer database, and a handful of supervisors who also need to be able to modify entries in that database The relationships between the privileges assigned to different groups can become complicated. For example, one group might explicitly grant a privilege whereas another group explicitly denies that same privilege.
246	Centralized and Decentralized Management In the early days of network operating systems, every computer maintained its own user accounts, groups, and permissions. When users needed access to the resources of a particular server, an administrator had to create accounts for them on that server and add them to the appropriate groups. This is known as decentralized management, because each server controlled access to its own resources, and administrators had to travel to each server or access it remotely to manage accounts. For each server a user accessed, the computers performed a separate authentication procedure
247	Single Sign-On The standard today is for users to perform a single sign-on when starting a computer session, which grants them access to resources all over the network. In most cases, on private networks, the single sign-on is provided by a directory service, such as Microsoft's Active Directory directory service or Novell's Novell Directory Services. Directory services typically use a digital certificate to authenticate a user's identity and grant them access to the resources they need. Directory services provide centralized management, so administrators only have to create one account for each user, all of which are stored in the same place, and the users only have to type their account names and passwords once. For Web applications, centralized management is provided by applications such as Microsoft Passport. Users
248	Auditing In addition to controlling access to network resources, privilege management typically provides administrators with a means of tracking resource usage, called auditing. In most cases, auditing is an optional feature that you have to enable manually before the system retains any information. The operating system typically saves the audit information to a log file, which administrators should review on a regular basis.
249	Removable Media Magnetic tape is the traditional storage medium of choice for backups and data archiving. Data stored on tapes can be secured using passwords or encryption, and the data can be completely and permanently erased if needed. CD-Rs and CD-RWs have become the most popular general-use removable storage media in recent years, due to their low cost and relatively high capacity. Data on CD-Rs and CD-RWs can be secured, and CD-RWs can be securely erased. CD-Rs must be physically destroyed to erase their data, and there is no practical destruction method at this time that is completely foolproof. The low cost and high capacity of hard disks have made them a viable solution for backups and archiving, now that drive arrays that allow quick removal of the device are common. Hard disks are relatively fragile compared to other storage media, however. Floppy disks are no longer a popular storage medium because of their slow speed and low capacity. In most cases, floppy disk drives can be removed from computers if an administrator wants to prevent users from copying confidential data. Flashcards are new technologies that store data in extremely compact form factors, making them a potential source of concern for security administrators. Smart cards are specialized data storage devices that are primarily used for authentication. They are encrypted to keep the information on them secure.
250	Magnetic Tape Protecting Magnetic Tape Data Unlike most other computer storage media, magnetic tape drives are not random access devices and do not function in the same way as hard disks, CD-ROMs, and other technologies. You can't simply copy files to the tape using standard file management tools. You must use a special program Erasing Magnetic Tapes Because magnetic tapes are not random access devices, erasing the data stored on them is relatively difficult. Preventing Tape Abuse Magnetic tape drives are not a common accessory on the average computer, so limiting access to them is not that difficult
251	CD / DVDs Compact Disc-Recordable (CD-R) and Compact Disc-Rewritable (CD-RW) drives have become almost ubiquitous in the home computer market, and they are commonly found on business computers as well DVD RW The surest way of erasing the data on a CD-RW, and the only way on a CD-R, is to physically destroy the disk, but even this can be problematic. Removing the reflective surface from the top of the disk certainly prevents it from being read
252	Hard Disks hard disks have historically been considered permanent computer components in recent years they have become a viable removable medium To completely erase all of the data on a hard disk, you can also perform a low-level format, which is the closest thing to starting with a completely new, empty disk.
253	More Floppy disk drives are still standard equipment on most computers A flashcard is a small data storage device conforming to any one of several manufacturers' standards, including Compact Flash, Smart Media, and Memory Stick A smart card is a credit-card sized device that contains a small amount of memory for storage and for software, and sometimes an integrated circuit, enabling it to perform some basic processing functions
254	Business Continuity Plan Identify the mission-critical processes that the business must perform to continue operating. Every business consists of multiple processes that together enable the company to produce a product or service and be compensated for it. By listing these separate processes, you can more easily prioritize the company's activities and identify the resources you need to proceed. Identify all of the resources required for the mission-critical processes to operate. The list of resources for each process should include raw materials, tools and other equipment, facilities, fixtures, utilities, and personnel; in short, it comprises everything necessary for the process to continue. Rate the relative importance of the mission-critical processes to the continuing operation of the business. Depending on the nature of the business, your first priority might be manufacturing your product, or it might be taking orders from customers. In any case, there will be certain processes that must continue uninterrupted if the business is to survive, and others that can withstand a temporary interruption. Decide on a course of action to be undertaken for each mission-critical process to plan for an interruption.
255	Implementing Business Continuity Preparations Backups High Availability and Fault Tolerance High availability and fault-tolerance mechanisms are measures that you can take to keep your business operating in the event of a systems failure. Data availability technologies such as a redundant array of independent disks (RAID) enable a server to continue operating without data loss when a hard disk fails The are a number of services such as electricity, running water, and mail, that are essential to keeping a business running. However, these services can be interrupted
256	Organizational Security Chapter 10
257	Standards, Guidelines, Plans Documentation creates the foundation of your security plan. You can use standards, guidelines, and government regulations to help formulate your organizational policies and procedures. It is useful to Use a Standard to Refer to Common Criteria is an international standard for evaluating the security of computer and network devices. Security policy is created from multiple subordinate policies such as access policy, accountability policy, authentication policy, password policy, firewall policy, and many other policies concerning privacy, system availability, maintenance, violations reporting, and acceptable use of equipment.
258	Policies and Procedures Security Policy To inform network users, technical support, and management of the requirements for protecting technology and information assets To provide guidelines for acquiring, configuring, monitoring, and assessing technology assets (that is, computer systems and networking devices) Computer Technology Purchasing Guidelines Computer technology purchasing guidelines are used to protect the organization from equipment that could lead to a security breach. These guidelines specify security features that are required or preferred by the organization
259	More Policies Access Policy An access policy provides guidelines for all personnel regarding the rights, privileges, and restrictions for using the organization's technology and information assets. Accountability Policy An accountability policy indicates the responsibilities of people in the organization Authentication Policy An authentication policy describes the acceptable methods, equipment, and parameters for allowing access to resources.
260	Password Policy Password length. The minimum (and possibly maximum) acceptable password length. Password complexity. The types of characters that can be used for passwords; for example, uppercase and lowercase letters and numbers, including the use of special characters such as @, #, $, %, ^, &, and *. Password expiration. The length of time a password can be used before it must be changed to something else. Password uniqueness. The number of unique passwords that a person must set before being able to use a previously used password. Account lockout threshold. The number of incorrect logon attempts permitted before an account is locked out. Account lockout duration. How long a locked out account remains locked out. This is typically an automated setting available in some operating systems. An account might be locked out for a certain number of minutes or indefinitely, requiring an administrator to reset the account.
261	Policies - More Availability Statement Information Technology System and Network Maintenance Policy Violations Reporting Policy Firewall Policy Antivirus Policy Privacy Policy Protecting Confidential Data Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Incident Response Policy Service Level Agreement Human Resources Policy I agree to protect the security of proprietary and private information that I handle. I agree to promote and follow organizational and informational security policies. I will report all suspected breaches of security. Due Care Inventories Classification Policy Retention and Storage
262	And More Possible Policies Disposal and Destruction Logs Systems Architecture Documentation Change and Configuration Management Policy A change and configuration management (CCM) policy is often part of a security policy The CCM policy should specify who is allowed to make changes to systems architecture. Separation of duties is a security concept advocating that it is more difficult for multiple people (as opposed to an individual) to successfully commit and conceal an unethical, fraudulent, or illegal act. This concept is commonly applied in the separation of the accounting function into two parts: accounts ayable and accounts receivable. Need to know is a basic security concept that holds that information should be limited to only those individuals who require it. The measure is to determine whether a person needs to know certain information to perform his or her job function appropriately.
263	Risk Assessment Calculate risk Identify assets Assess threats Assess vulnerabilities
264	Asset Identification and Valuation Personnel. People are often called the most important asset of an organization; this category includes users, maintenance personnel, and administrators. Information system equipment. All information systems hardware including computers, servers, network cabling, routers, switches, hubs, and all related devices are assets to the organization. Software. All types of computer software are assets, including operating systems, diagnostic utilities, office applications, and so on. Information. All data is an asset to the organization. Be sure to include data in applications, databases, user accounts, home directories, backups, archives, and logs. Documentation. All of the policies, procedures, and supporting information are valuable to the organization. At a minimum the documentation is worth the time that it would take to re-create it. Furniture. Desks, chairs, couches, conference tables, rolling carts, and all other manner of furniture that the organization owns are assets. Production machinery. Any machinery that is used to produce products must be considered an asset. For example, a restaurant typically has a kitchen with oven, stove, cooking utensils, and other equipment. Vehicles. Company cars, vans, buses, and other vehicles are all assets. Physical structures. All physical structures that the organization owns, such as buildings, office spaces, and production facilities are assets. Other items. Supplies such as paper, ribbons, removable media, pens, pencils, and staplers are also part of the organization's assets.
265	Threat Identification Natural. Natural threats include fires, floods, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tornadoes, mudslides, avalanches, thunderstorms, and other natural disasters. Environmental. Environmental threats can include pollutants, chemical spills, long-term power outages, and other situations. Human. Human threats include any intentional or unintentional human action that might cause harm to organizational assets
266	Threat Likelihood - rating 1 - A low rating, denoting that there is no history of the threat ever attempting to compromise this organization or similar organizations. The threat is unlikely to affect the organization in the future. 2 - A medium-low rating, indicating there is little history of the threat attempting to compromise similar organizations. There is a minimal chance that the threat will affect this organization in the future. 3 - A medium rating, signifying there is some history of the threat compromising this organization or similar organizations. The threat might affect the organization in the future. 4 - A medium-high rating, denoting there is notable history of the threat compromising this organization or similar organizations. The threat will likely affect this organization in the future. 5 - A high rating, indicating there is significant history of the threat compromising this organization or similar organizations. The threat is very likely to affect this organization in the future.
267	Impact Assessment 1 -A low rating concerning an annoyance or minor, superficial damage. 2 - A medium-low rating, indicating a minor disruption or small (but measurable) loss of productivity. 3 - A medium rating, indicating a loss of information or successful denial of service. 4 - A medium-high rating, indicating a full loss of connectivity, serious disruption of business operations, or some other effect that seriously impedes business operations. 5- A high rating, representing a significant business loss (potential loss of the organization to function at all, loss of life, or serious physical injury).
268	Vulnerability Assessment 1- A low rating, denoting that the organization is well prepared to handle the specified threat. 2 - A medium-low rating, indicating the organization is mostly prepared to handle the threat; there are a few additional safety measures that could be taken. 3 - A medium rating, signifying that the organization has some safety measures in place for this threat, but it is still somewhat vulnerable to the specified threat. 4 - A medium-high rating, denoting that the organization has very few safety measures in place for this vulnerability. The organization is vulnerable to the specified threat. 5 - A high rating, indicating that the organization has no safety measures in place for this threat. The organization is very vulnerable to the specified threat.
269	Security Education Communication lines must be open for a security program to be successful. Support from top executives and the security administrator should be quite evident throughout the organization. Organizational members should be encouraged to ask questions, express concerns, and report violations. Security awareness is largely a marketing effort to promote the organization's security program. This effort can be undertaken with logon banners, trinkets with messages, motivational slogans, and a variety of other attention-catching methods. Security training seeks to increase involvement and teach people how to accomplish tasks. Security training is most effective when it is hands-on and directly related to the participant's job. Security education is an ongoing effort. As organizational members move into discussing, researching, and fully participating, they are embracing the education stage.
270	User Awareness Logon access banners. These banners are displayed when the user logs on. Audio/video. These awareness materials are delivered on video, audio, computer-based, or Web-based formats. Posters or flyers. These can contain simple tips for complying with security policy and best practices, such as how to create strong passwords. Promotional or specialty trinkets. Part of your security awareness program could include giveaways or prizes that have security slogans on them. Newsletters, magazines, and briefings. Notes, tips, and articles are other methods for distributing a security awareness message. Training
271	Incident Detection and Response Chapter 11
272	Attacks and Malicious Code Attackers typically use scanners to locate potential targets and security weaknesses. You can better protect your network by running scanners on it to find and correct weaknesses before attackers. Remove all unnecessary services and patch all discovered vulnerabilities. There are numerous types of DoS and DDoS attacks that attackers can use in attempts to hinder business operations of a target organization. You can reduce the effectiveness of many of these attacks by configuring appropriate filtering rules on your firewalls and routers. Also, maintain a good relationship with your ISP to ensure that you can mitigate a successful DoS attack. Source routing can be used by an attacker to route packets around security devices on your network. To prevent this, configure your routers to drop packets that contain LSRR information. Password guessing and encryption breaking can both be accomplished by brute force. To prevent such attacks from being successful, employ the latest and strongest encryption mechanisms and longest key lengths practical. If you must use passwords, ensure that you educate your users on creating secure passwords that cannot be easily broken by a dictionary attack. Ensure that users know not to write passwords down or share them with other people. Implement strong password policies, so that users must change their passwords frequently.
273	Scanning can provide attackers with the following information: Network topology Types of traffic allowed through the firewall Active hosts on a network Operating systems running on a target computer Types of connectivity devices present on a network Type of applications that are running on a network Software version numbers and patch levels Account information
274	Scanners Advanced Administrative Tools from G-Lock Software. Xprobe2 from Sys-Security Tools. GFI LANguard Network Security Scanner. Network Mapper (NMAP), a network scanning utility that runs on a wide variety of operating systems. Computer Cops, which provides several different scanners, including a Web-based version of NMAP. Foundstone offers several scanning tools, such as BOping, SuperScan, ScanLine, SNScan, and DDosping. Each tool includes a description of its scanning capabilities. Nessus offers a free vulnerability scanner. The Arirang CGI scanner is designed specifically to identify Common Gateway Interface (CGI) vulnerabilities. Internet Security Scanner (ISS) and Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks (SATAN). Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA) and the Microsoft Network Security Hot Fix Checker (HFNetChk). EtherPeek and AiroPeek are available from WildPackets Inc. Sniffer software products are available at http://www.sniffer.com.
275	ARP Scanning Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) addresses are used in all Internet Protocol (IP)-based communication between computers. ARP converts IP addresses into media access control (MAC) addresses so that network adapters can communicate with one another on a network. Attackers can use ARP to map out the number of active hosts on a network by sending ARP broadcast packets to all the possible address of a particular segment
276	ICMP Scanning Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) provides error and information messages for IP-based networks. ICMP scans, like ARP scans, can also be used to identify active hosts on the network ICMP echo. Echo scan is also known as a ping sweep or ping scan because the ping utility utilizes ICMP echo requests to locate hosts ICMP router solicitation ICMP address mask scan.
277	UDP Scanning Attackers use User Datagram Protocol (UDP) port scans to identify potentially exploitable services that a target is running. Exploitable services such as chargen, daytime, and echo run over UDP and could be discovered in such a scan
278	skilled attacker can determine many things about the target, UDP port 53 (domain) indicates that the target is a Domain Name System (DNS) server. UDP port 161 is used for Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), a management service that the attacker could potentially exploit to find out even more information about the host and potentially the network. UDP port 3456 is used for IISRPC, indicating that the server is running Internet Information Services (IIS) Remote Procedure Call (RPC). Based on this, the attacker could make a good guess that the system is likely a Microsoft operating system and might be running Web and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) services. The attacker could follow up by attempting exploits against all of these services and focused attacks for Microsoft systems. UDP ports 88 for Kerberos, 123 for Network Time Protocol (NTP), 389 for Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), and 464 for Kerberos passwords (kpass) are indications that the target is probably an Active Directory domain controller. UDP ports 137 and 138 are used for Network Basic Input/Output Service (NetBIOS). UDP 445 is used for Server Message Block (SMB) over TCP/IP. The presence of these ports and services is indicative of a server that is enabled for Microsoft networking.
279	TCP Scanning Connect TCP connect scans (also called vanilla TCP connect scans) are used to identify potential targets and services. This type of scan utilizes the full TCP three-way handshake. The attacker sends a TCP connection request with synchronize (SYN) segment and awaits a synchronize-acknowledgment (SYN-ACK) or reset (RST) response from the target host. If the target's TCP port is closed, the response is RST. If the target's TCP port is open, then a SYN-ACK is returned. If the attacker receives a SYN-ACK, the attacker knows the service is available. The attacker then sends the final ACK segment to complete the TCP handshake Half-Open Half-open scans (also called SYN or SYN stealth scans) achieve the same goal as TCP connect scans: identifying potential targets and listening TCP services. However, the half-open scan is not as "polite" as the connect scan because the scanning device or attacker never sends the final ACK packet
280	More FIN When a basic firewall or router blocks other TCP scans, the TCP FIN scan might succeed. The FIN scan, like other TCP scans, is used to identify listening TCP ports based on a response, or lack of a response, to a finish (FIN) packet. Attackers send the TCP FIN packet to the target host, even though they haven't previously made any connections to the target. If the target responds with an RST packet, the TCP port solicited is closed. If the target has an open TCP port, it discards the packet and doesn't respond. No response is an indication of an open port (or at least a potentially open port), so an attacker can then follow up with other scans, connection attempts, or attempts to exploit services on the target system. XMAS Another derivative TCP scan designed to bypass basic firewalls or routers with filtering capabilities is the XMAS scan (also called a Xmas tree scans). This scan uses a series of varied TCP packets to identify listening TCP ports on target devices. Some characteristics of XMAS scan packets include TCP sequence numbers of zero, and FIN, urgent (URG), or push (PSH) flags set. Target devices send a TCP RST packet if their ports are closed. Target devices discard XMAS packets and provide no response when the TCP port is open. NULL Yet another TCP scan designed to penetrate firewalls and filtering routers is the TCP NULL scan. A NULL scan is similar to the XMAS scan in that TCP sequence numbers are zero, but the NULL scan passes no flags at all. As with the XMAS and FIN scans, if a port is closed, the target sends an RST packet. If the port is open, the target discards the packet without a response. ACK TCP ACK scans are often used instead of ping sweeps to identify active hosts on the network. If an RST packet is returned, the client port is unfiltered by a firewall and might even have a service available on that port. If no response is returned, or the response returned is an ICMP destination unreachable message, then the port is probably filtered by a firewall
281	DoS/DDoS DoS and DDoS attacks. As you know, DoS and DDoS attacks seek to disrupt normal operations. Essentially, a DoS attack is any attack that consumes or disables resources in an attempt to hinder or disrupt some operation or function. Some DoS attacks target specific software flaws and others attempt to consume resources so that legitimate users cannot utilize a service. DDoS attacks are DoS attacks conducted simultaneously from multiple computers. DDoS attacks are often conducted using other compromised computers running zombie software, which is any software under the remote command of an attacker. A computer running zombie software is known as a zombie or zombie host. Zombies are often computers that don't belong to the attacker, but instead are computers that the attacker was able to compromise. The actual owner of the computer often does not know that his or her system is running zombie software and attacking other computers
282	Spoofing Spoofing attacks are discussed throughout this book. As you know, spoofing is pretending to be someone else by impersonating, masquerading, or mimicking that person. Here are some of the forms of spoofing discussed in this book: IP address spoofing is forging the IP source address in one or more IP packets to show that the packet came from a source other than the true source of the packet. ARP cache poisoning or spoofing is a method for placing incorrect information in computers' ARP caches to misroute packets. RIP spoofing uses the Routing Information Protocol (RIP) to update routing tables with bogus information.
283	Protection Egress filtering Ingress filtering Disable IP-directed broadcasts
284	Source Routing Source routing, defined in RFC 791, is a technique that allows the sender or source of a packet to identify the route that the packet should take through the network. Typically, a router determines where the next hop should be for a packet to reach its destination. However, when source routing is used, the sender determines some or all of the hops that the packet should take across the network. In strict source routing, the sender must specify the entire route that the packet must take, but this is almost never done. Instead, a loose source and record route (LSRR) is typically used, in which the sender gives one or more hops that the packet must traverse. Unfortunately, source routing allows an attacker to attempt to evade security controls on a network by routing packets around filtering routers (and possibly firewalls
285	Man-in-the-Middle SMBRelay tool is used between two SMB hosts (typically Microsoft or Microsoft-compatible networking systems). Windows 2000 and later Microsoft operating systems allow for SMB signing, which helps to thwart man-in-the-middle attempts. SSHmitm. SSHmitm is part of the dsniff toolkit SSHmitm exploits Secure Shell (SSH) version 1 traffic by acting as a proxy between SSH sessions. This tool can capture information and encrypted logins. To prevent this exploit
286	Back Door A back door is a program or account that allows security measures to be circumvented. At one time, back doors were common in many products because vendors installed them to make supporting clients easier. Of course, once attackers discovered them, attacking that equipment or software was also easier. In addition to finding pre-established back doors, many attackers can create or obtain back door software that helps them exploit systems. For instance, Trojan horse programs might be used as back doors. An example of this is a program called Apher Trojan, which was advertised as a virus scanner update to several victims. Instead, the Apher Trojan installed Backdoor.Death.25, a back door program that allows an attacker to remotely control the victim's computer.
287	Password Guessing Password guessing attacks are dictionary attacks, in which a password-guessing or password-cracking program uses a preexisting list of words to try to guess a password. Originally, dictionary attacks were limited to words found in a dictionary, but they have since evolved to include names, numbers, and special characters. Further, modern dictionary attacks are not limited to any type of character set or combination. For example, a user named Sharon might decide that $haRon54 is a good password because it includes a dollar sign, an uppercase letter, and two numbers. However, a dictionary attack might discover such a password quite easily because the substitution of $ for S is so common that dictionary scanners often include this feature. Further, the numbers in this password are likely Sharon's birth year without the leading two digits (presumably 19). Here again a dictionary attack would likely add two- and four-digit years to the end of common names. Where the dictionary attack fails, the brute force attack usually succeeds
288	Replay Attack Replay attacks involve listening to and repeating data passed on the network. An attacker tries to capture packets containing passwords or digital signatures as they pass between two hosts on the network using a protocol analyzer. The attacker then filters the data and extracts the portion of the packet that contains the password, encryption key, or digital signature. Later, the attacker resends (replays) that information in an attempt to gain access to a secured resource.
289	Encryption Breaking Researchers and attackers have broken many encryption algorithms. For example, the RC4 encryption standard and the Wired Equivalent Privacy standard (based on RC4) implement weak encryption keys that can be broken in a very short time. In 1997, Ian Goldberg, at that time a graduate student at the University of California, Berkeley, used 250 computers to break 40-bit RC4 in less than four hours.
290	Mathematical Attacks Time and processing speed are the only factors determining the security of an encryption algorithm. Mathematical or brute force attacks can be used to break any encryption algorithm. 40-bit encryption was quickly broken in 1997. Two years later, the 56-bit Data Encryption Standard (DES) was broken in less than 23 hours by a team from the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Distributed.Net. Although every algorithm is vulnerable to brute force attacks, longer key lengths provide better security
291	Birthday Paradox The birthday paradox or birthday attack is more of a theory than an actual attack. The birthday paradox, simply stated, is that in every group of 23 people there is more than a 50 percent chance that two people share the same birthday. If you translate this concept into password or encryption breaking, there is better than a 50 percent chance that two passwords in any group of 23 are the same. Of course, that alone doesn't allow you to discover a password or encryption key, nor does it tell you which two of the possible 253 pairs match. Remember also that there is better than a 40 percent chance that none of the pairs match in that particular group.
292	Hijacking Session hijacking - situation in which communications between two computers (client and server) are taken over by a third (attacker's) computer. The session is essentially stolen from the client. The attacker's computer bumps the client system off its session and begins communicating with the server without going through the full authentication process, gaining access to a secured resource without authentication. Researchers and attackers discovered methods for hijacking TCP connections, terminal connections, and wireless connections.
293	Software Exploitation Buffer overflows are the most common exploit discovered. There are many other types of software vulnerabilities Cross-site scripting, in which Web sites inadvertently include malicious Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) code in their Web pages. Attackers often place the code there in successful attempts at compromising the Web page
294	Social Engineering A common way for an attacker to do this is to pretend to be part of the technical support staff for the organization. The attacker then contacts a user, explaining that he or she needs the user's password to perform some maintenance or troubleshooting activity on that user's system or the network. Many other forms of social engineering exist, most conducted over the telephone. However, an attacker might be bold enough to take a part-time job cleaning offices, for example, to search for passwords that are written down. Employees should be advised that company security is in their hands. They must realize that writing a password down or giving it to someone else puts the whole organization's information security systems at risk.
295	Malicious Code Dropper. A dropper is a virus carrier program or file. When the dropper is executed or opened, it creates a virus. Virus authors often use droppers to shield their programs from virus scanners. Droppers are also called injectors. Hoax. A hoax is false virus warning that people believe is real. These hoaxes are typically spread through e-mail messages. Joke. A joke is a nondestructive program that is propagated like malicious code. People usually consider this type of program annoying or funny. Logic bomb. A logic bomb is a destructive program that goes off when a predetermined event takes place, such as the user typing a certain series of keystrokes, changing a file, or occurrence of a certain time and date. A logic bomb that is triggered at a certain date and time is also called a time bomb. Multipartite virus. A multipartite virus infects multiple locations on a system. These viruses typically infect memory first and then copy themselves to multiple other locations, such as the boot sector of each hard disk, files, and executables on the system. Polymorphic virus. A polymorphic virus, or mutating virus, changes or mutates as it copies itself to other files or programs. The goal is to make it difficult to detect and remove the virus. Sparse virus. A sparse virus doesn't immediately infect files. Instead, it waits a certain period of time (or for some other condition to be met) before it infects a program. For example, the sparse virus might wait until a file is accessed 50 times or until it reaches 500 MB in size. This makes the virus more difficult to detect. A sparse virus is also called a sparse infector.
296	More Code Stealth virus. A stealth virus attempts to hide itself from detection attempts by deceiving people or virus scanning software. When a person or virus scanner attempts to view the virus-infected file, the stealth virus intercepts the disk access request and feeds the person or virus scanner an uninfected version of the file. The virus might also report the uninfected file size of certain files, which prevents people and virus scanners from noticing that a file is too large. Of course, the virus must be resident in memory to perform this action, so a good virus scanner can detect a stealth virus. Stealth viruses are also called interrupt interceptors. Trojan horse. A Trojan horse is a seemingly useful (or harmless) program that performs malicious or illicit action when activated, such as destroying files. Virus. A virus is malicious code that infects or attaches itself to other objects or programs. All viruses have some form of replication mechanism, which is how they propagate. Wild. Wild is a descriptor for malicious code that exists outside of virus and antivirus labs. Malicious code is "in the wild" when it is infecting unsuspecting computer users. The opposite of malicious code in the wild is malicious code in the zoo, discussed later. You can learn more about viruses reported to be in the wild from the WildList Organization International at http://www.wildlist.org. Worm. A worm is malicious code that replicates by making copies of itself on the same computer or by sending copies of itself to another computer. Worms, unlike viruses, do not infect other program files on a computer. All worms have some form of replication mechanism, which is how they propagate. Zoo. Zoo is a descriptor for malicious code that only exists inside a virus or antivirus lab. The opposite of malicious code in the zoo is malicious code in the wild.
297	Intrusion Detection Systems An IDS can be implemented as a network intrusion detection system (NIDS), system integrity verifier (SIV), or log file monitor (LFM). A brief explanation of each is reiterated here: A NIDS monitors network traffic and traffic patterns to discover someone attempting a DoS attack, port scans, or attempts to guess the password to a secured resource. An SIV monitors a single system's file structure to determine if (and when) an attacker modifies, deletes, or changes a system file. An alternate name for SIV IDS is target-based IDS. An LFM parses system log entries (from one or more systems) to identify possible system attacks or compromises.
298	Network-Based IDS Increase overall security. The more layers of protection you have on your network, the safer the network is from attack. Protect multiple systems. A few well-placed NIDS's can protect a large network because they monitor all traffic on their subnet. Allow monitoring traffic inside your firewall. Some attacks come from the inside. A firewall at the threshold of your network or even at the perimeter network is not going to protect internal client systems from each other. NIDS can help you to discover internal attacks. Alert you to incoming attacks. By monitoring network traffic, NIDS can alert you when an attack is taking place, such as an attempt to overflow a buffer. Detect slow attacks. NIDS can keep track of suspicious activities over a long period of time. For example, if an attacker conducts a scan over a period of a week or month, NIDS can keep track of this and report when a certain threshold is met or exceeded. Delayed analysis. Some NIDS's allow you to capture packets now for later forensic investigation, sometimes referred to as honeynet mode. Take corrective action. Some NIDS's can actually do something beyond logging and alerting you to attacks. For example, some NIDS's could be used to change the configuration of a client or firewall to eliminate a possible attack.
299	NIDS's Limitations, Processing speed. Just like every device on the network, NIDS's have limited processing power and collection capabilities. NIDS's can drop packets and misdiagnose network issues if they are overwhelmed with packets to analyze. Ensure that the NIDS you select can keep up with the network on which you are planning to place it. Issues with segmentation. NIDS's listen to the traffic on a given network segment. NIDS capability is reduced when a switch, virtual local area network (VLAN), or router is used to reduce network traffic. The solution to this problem typically involves adding sensors to each segment. In the case of a switch, plug the NIDS into the monitoring port, which allows it to receive all traffic passing through the switch. Issues with encryption. The payload of an encrypted packet is difficult to analyze. Most NIDS's don't decrypt packets, so attacks that are encrypted tend to bypass NIDS detection mechanisms. Later in the lesson, we cover potential solutions to this issue. Attack success. Most NIDS's cannot determine whether an attack was successful; they report only that an attack was initiated. This means that network administrators must follow up to check if an attacked system was compromised. False positives and missed detections. A NIDS can only discover what it is programmed to discover. If an event appears to be an attack, a NIDS reports it. If a real attack doesn't appear to be an attack, a NIDS won't detect it. Detection methods and related issues are discussed later in this lesson. NIDS attacks. Some creative software engineers have developed tools to fool NIDS's or even attack them. Such tools are discussed later in this lesson.
300	NIDS Attack and Evasion Attackers might attempt to attack, bypass, disable, or fool those systems. There are several publicly available tools for attacking or confusing NIDS's. Here are some examples and descriptions of NIDS attack tools: Stick launches a direct attack against the NIDS using a Snort signature file that is used to identify attacks. The attack causes a large number of false alarms, which reduces the system resources of the NIDS. So many false alarms could cause a real alarm to go unnoticed by security administrators or the real alarm might not even be logged by the NIDS due to lack of system resources. Fragroute is a NIDS evasion tool that hides attacks from the NIDS by obfuscating attack packets. The tool intercepts, modifies, rewrites, and reorders packets so that the NIDS cannot identify them. Tribe Flood Network 2000 is a DDoS attack tool that uses encryption, decoy packets, and IP address spoofing to avoid NDIS identification. (DDoS attacks are described in more detail in the next lesson.)
301	Host-Based IDS A host-based IDS (HIDS) is installed on individual computers to protect those individual systems. HIDS's are much more reliable than NIDS's in detecting attacks on individual systems They are better than NIDS's at monitoring and keeping track of local system events. They aren't typically hindered by encrypted attacks. HIDS's can read transmitted packets before they are encrypted and received packets after they are decrypted. They can help to detect software integrity breaches, such as Trojan horse software, file modifications, and so on. Because HIDS's only protect a single system, switches, VPNs, and routers do not affect their functionality.
302	HIDS's limitations Difficult to manage. HIDS's are more difficult to manage than NIDS's in large networks because they must be configured and controlled on individual systems. Susceptible to DoS attacks. Attacks against the HIDS-protected host might affect the HIDS itself. DoS attacks against the host might disrupt or disable the HIDS. A successful attack against a host protected by a HIDS could potentially disable and destroy evidence collected by the HIDS. Require host resources. HIDS's require resources from the protected host. HIDS's need extra hard disk space to store logs and tracking information. HIDS's must also utilize processor time and memory to analyze packets, user-issued commands, audit trails, and system logs to protect the client.
303	Application-Based IDS Bbenefits to using an application-based IDS, which include the following: Monitor user/application interaction. Application-based IDS's can monitor the interaction between the user and the application, which could allow for the tracing of unauthorized activities. Unaffected by encryption. Application-based IDS's read and analyze application transactions and commands, so they are completely unaffected by network encryption and decryption. limitations to application-based IDS's, such as these: Vulnerable to attack. Similar to a HIDS, an application-based IDS is close to the potential target of attack, the protected application. If the application is under attack, the logs that the application-based IDS analyzes (or the application-based IDS software itself) might be targeted in that attack. Difficulty detecting malicious software. Unlike HIDS's, application-based IDS's typically won't identify Trojan horses or other malicious software because they focus on a specific application's security,
304	Detection Methods A misuse detection in IDS (also called signature-based detection) works a lot like a virus scanner. A virus scanner locates viruses by identifying the virus programming code within a file, in memory, attached to e-mail, or somewhere else on a system's removable or fixed media. Misuse detection involves identifying an attack signature, which is some indicator that a specific attack is occurring. Misuse detectors analyze system activity, looking for events that match a predefined pattern of attack. Misuse detectors must have their attack signatures updated as new attack types are discovered. Again, this is similar to virus scanners, which must have their virus signature files updated. Anomaly detectors identify unusual activities or situations, called anomalies. Anomaly detectors classify abnormalities as potential attacks. To determine what is normal and what is not, an anomaly detector must gather information about the systems and networks on which it operates. Once enough information is available, the anomaly detector can identify abnormalities based on historical data.
305	Response Types An IDS active response (also called active detection) is an automatic action that a system takes when it recognizes an attack. The response might be innocuous, such as increasing information collection; moderate, such as reconfiguring the network; or severe, such as launching a counterattack against the intruder. Of all the active response types, increasing information collection is the safest because it is unlikely to cause the organization any additional problems. An IDS passive response (or passive detection) is much less complex than active response. Passive responses leave the response to the intrusion in the hands of the system or security administrator. A passive response involves alerting the administrator that an attack might be taking place. This means the IDS might activate an alarm or send a network alert, e-mail, or page indicating that a threshold was exceeded or an attack signature was identified
306	IDS Deployment 4 stages Deploy a limited NIDS. Deploy NIDS sensors Deploy a limited HIDS Fully deploy a HIDS A, B, C, D, and E) where NIDS sensors could be deployed on a sample network
307	IDS Intrusion detection systems (IDS's) can collect and analyze information in different ways. Some analyze information from the network, others from system files, and still others from log files. Many IDS's analyze information from multiple sources. IDS's can be network-based, host-based, or application-based. NIDS's are able to protect a larger number of systems and are easier to implement than HIDS's. However, NIDS's are limited by their processing power and ability to decode packets quickly. NIDS's also have trouble with encryption, VLANs, and encrypted tunnels. HIDS's are able to work around encryption and provide better individual host protection. However, HIDS's might be compromised during an attack on the target and might lose valuable information. Application-based IDS's are best for detecting specific attacks on applications and are not limited by data encryption. However, like HIDS's, they can be compromised or disabled in an attack. Typical IDS responses are passive, allowing the administrator to take action when an incident occurs. Active IDS responses have different levels of severity. The most benign level is to increase logging. An intermediate level is to reconfigure the network in some way as a response to an attack. This has the drawback of potentially creating a security hole or disrupting normal operations. The most severe active response is to launch a counterattack. This could cause the organization additional difficulties, especially if the counterattack is launched against an innocent party. IDS deployment is best done in stages. This allows network staff to customize and become familiar with IDS implementations. The NIDS should be deployed first. Once the NIDS is fully configured and deployed, the HIDS can be deployed to critical hosts. After critical hosts are successfully configured and running with a HIDS, a full HIDS deployment can be contemplated.
308	Incident Response CSIRTs can be either formalized or ad hoc teams. CSIRTs help an organization deal with computer security incidents and possibly protect other organizations from compromise. There are CSIRTs all over the world that are willing to work with network administrators and other CSIRTs to help reduce the damage caused by attackers and malicious code. Computer forensics is the investigation and analysis of computer security incidents with the objective of collecting evidence. Evidence must be gathered carefully so that other evidence is not disturbed. When possible, systems should be analyzed by making images or backups to avoid disturbing a system that might be used as evidence in a legal proceeding. A chain of custody is required to prove that evidence is preserved and unaltered. Without a chain of custody, evidence might be considered invalid. Evidence must be carefully preserved with plenty of documentation, including logs, reports, pictures, backups, and system images. Two copies of all evidence that can be duplicated should be maintained. One copy should be maintained onsite and one copy should be held offsite to protect evidence in case of a natural disaster or subsequent attack
309	computer security incident response team (CSIRT). When a computer security incident occurs, some person or group should take the lead in receiving, reviewing, and responding to incident reports and activity. In an organization, this is typically the person designated as the security officer. Some organizations appoint teams to handle security incidents. Such a team is often called a computer security incident response team (CSIRT). A CSIRT could be an ad hoc team, assembled only when an incident is reported, or a formal team supported by a corporation, governmental body, educational institution, or some other type of organization.
310	Incident Response Basics Protect people's lives and safety. Protect classified and sensitive data first. Protect other data. Protect hardware and software. Minimize disruption of business services and operations.
311	More Forensics Computer forensics describes the investigation and analysis of computer security incidents with the interests of gathering and preserving potential legal evidence. This section describes the components and important aspects of computer forensic investigation. In this section you learn the basics about collecting evidence, maintaining a chain of custody, and preserving evidence. Collection of Evidence When an incident occurs, you should immediately begin to collect evidence. This evidence can help you learn from the intrusion and improve your systems, their operation, and your staff's capabilities. Evidence might be required for the following reasons: To locate, educate, reprimand, or terminate negligent or responsible employees. To prosecute attackers for computer crimes or misuses. To describe your situation and obtain help from other CSIRTs
312	Point of Contact!! Point of Contact Appoint someone as the point of contact to be responsible for maintaining contact with law enforcement and other CSIRTs. This person should coordinate all activities and disseminate information appropriately to internal and external personnel. The point of contact should also be responsible for coordinating the collection of evidence to ensure that it is done in accordance with all laws and legal regulations. Work Carefully Before you begin work on a compromised system, consider what your actions might mean to the present state of the system. When gathering evidence, concentrate on not altering anything and meticulously document all of your actions for later reference. This is often difficult because you might need to disconnect the system from the network to stop the malicious activity
313	Chain Of Custody Forensic Tools Many of the tools you need to conduct a forensic investigation are often part of the operating system you are using. Collect All Available Information All information concerning the incident must be recorded and securely stored. You should establish, examine, and preserve an audit trail. An audit trail is a record of who accessed a computer and what operations he or she performed Chain of Custody A chain of custody must be maintained for all evidence. A documented chain of custody shows who collected and had access to each piece of evidence. Failure to maintain this chain of custody might invalidate your evidence
314	Preservation of Evidence Protecting the evidence you gather is critical. As mentioned previously, work carefully and change as little as possible. Try to conduct your investigation on a separate system that is a restored backup or imaged version of the compromised system. Everything you do must be thoroughly documented. Follow these rules to preserve evidence: Archive and retain all information concerning an intrusion until the investigation and any legal proceedings are complete. Preserve all critical information onsite and offsite. Make copies of all logs, system hard disks, policies, procedures, system and network configurations, photographs, cryptographic checksums, databases, and system backups. Offsite storage preserves evidence in the event of a natural disaster or subsequent intrusion. Define, document, and follow a strict procedure for securing and accessing evidence both onsite and offsite.
315	Questions and Comments